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Abstract
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of
identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical
outcome of the auction that is the only natural equilibrium and is unique under a refinement of subgame
perfect equilibria. We show certain interesting properties of this equilibrium; for instance, we show that
the prices decrease as the auction progresses. This phenomenon has been observed in many experiments
and previous theoretic work attributed it to features such as uncertainty in the supply or risk averse
bidders. We show that such features are not needed for this phenomenon and that it arises purely from the
most essential features: budget constraints and the sequential nature of the auction. A little surprisingly
we also show that in this equilibrium one agent wins all his items in the beginning and then the other
agent wins the rest. The major difficulty in analyzing such sequential auctions has been in understanding
how the selling prices of the first few rounds affect the utilities of the agents in the later rounds. We tackle
this difficulty by identifying certain key properties of the auction and the proof is via a joint induction
on all of them.
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1 Introduction
Currently, there is a rich and well developed theory of auctions, most of it focused on single-round auctions,
where all the items are auctioned off at once. Yet, many real world instances of auctions for multiple
items are sequential in nature and the theory behind such auctions is still in a nascent stage. Another
commonly occurring real-world aspect of auctions is budget constraints and incorporating budget constraints
into traditional auction theory has often been quite challenging. The combination of sequential auctions and
budget constraints is very natural and occurs commonly. This has been well recognized by the economics
community. A modern-day instance of this combination is the much studied ad-auction; there have been
many theoretical results capturing different aspects of ad-auctions. However there has been little to no
theoretical results on the sequential nature of these auctions, even though there have been empirical studies
that suggest bidders in these auctions do strategize to exhaust their competitors’ budgets and take advantage
of an emptier playing field Zhou and Lukose (2007). The goal of this paper is to characterize and extend our
understanding of sequential auctions with budget constrained bidders.
Our results are based on a simple yet rich model that preserves the most essential features we wish to
understand: the sequential nature combined with budget constraints. The model is simple because the items
are identical, the number of items is fixed and known and agents have complete information.1 Yet, the model
is rich enough that the equilibrium outcomes display a rather complicated pattern (See Tables 1 and 2). Our
results need substantial work and the difficulties we face and the techniques we employ are summarized in
Section 1.2.
Our model is as follows: there are multiple identical items and two agents interested in obtaining them.
Each agent wants to acquire as many items as possible but is subject to a budget constraint. The items are
auctioned off sequentially, that is, the items are auctioned one after the other, each auction starting after the
previous one is completed. The agents have complete information, that is each agent knows the budget of
the other and the total number of items. This scenario can be thought of as a 2-player extensive game. The
question we seek to answer in this paper is, what are the subgame perfect equilibria of this game.
The above question is one of the most basic that can be asked about sequential auctions with budget
constrained bidders. The intuition for what should happen in the above game is also fairly straight forward:
each agent tries to exhaust the budget of the other as soon as possible, so that he can have the rest of the
items for himself at a low price. This intuition as well as the importance of this question was recognized as
early as Pitchik and Schotter (1986). However so far it has not been possible to analyze such games with
more than two items and these games have come to be regarded as quite difficult to analyze. The difficulty
arises from the fact that as the number of rounds increases, the effects of an outcome in the first round on
those in the later rounds become extremely complex. At least part of this difficulty arises due to the budget
constraint as opposed to, say, a unit-demand constraint. (We present a detailed discussion of these aspects
in Section 1.2).
In each round we consider a first-price sealed-bid auction. One could also consider alternatives such as
a second-price auction (See Section 3.4 for a comparison) or an ascending price auction, but for technical
reasons a first-price auction is most appropriate. One issue with subgame perfect equilibria as such is that
there are many unnatural equilibria, for instance, even for a single-item auction. We need to consider a
stronger notion of equilibrium in order to rule out these unnatural equilibria, and the one we use is a variant
of the trembling hand perfect equilibrium. (See Section 2 for a precise definition.) Under this refinement,
we show that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, for any number of items. (All
earlier results only consider two items.) This unique equilibrium is indeed the natural equilibrium of the
game and we refer to this as the canonical equilibrium. We show several properties of this equilibrium,
1Understanding idealized models such as one with complete information case provides a benchmark with which we can compare
more realistic settings.
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some surprising and some expected.
• The number of items won by an agent is approximately proportional to his budget.
• The prices are monotonically non-increasing as the auction progresses.
• One agent wins all of his items in the beginning and then the other agent wins the remaining items.
We now discuss each of these properties in more detail.
Number of Items Won This is perhaps the least surprising of all the properties. It is natural to expect
that the number of items won is approximately proportional to the budget. However, an interesting contrast
surfaces when we compare the number of items won here with the number of items won in the adaptive
clinching auction of Dobzinski et al. (2011). It turns out that the number of items won in the sequential
auction is more equitable, and closer to the proportion of the budget than in the adaptive clinching auction.
A detailed comparison is presented in Section 5.
Monotonicity of Prices Pitchik and Schotter (1988) ran lab experiments of sequential auctions that showed
that prices decrease as the auction progresses. Since then such experiments have been repeated by others
and the monotonic decrease of prices has been reaffirmed Ashenfelter (1989). Almost all subsequent theo-
retical results have tried to capture this phenomenon. Actually the first among these, e.g., Weber (1981) and
Milgrom and Weber (1982) showed the opposite, that prices increase. Later, different results attributed the
decreasing price phenomenon to different features of the model: Jeitschko (1999) showed that decreasing
prices could occur due to uncertainty in the number of items, Black and Meza (1992) attributed it to de-
creasing marginal utilities and McAfee and Vincent (1993) to risk aversion. The game we consider does not
have any of these features: the number of items is fixed and known, the marginal utilities are constant and
the agents are risk neutral. Our result shows that the decreasing prices phenomenon occurs purely from the
most essential properties: the budget constraint and the sequential nature of the game.
The Order of Sale As one would expect, the number of items won by an agent is approximately propor-
tional to his budget. The real surprise is in the order in which the items are won. Although the intuition
we mentioned earlier says that an agent tries to exhaust the other agent’s budget, it is conceivable that they
win alternately to maintain the ratio of items won along the way. But the equilibrium outcome is at the
other extreme. The ratio of the budgets not only determines the number of items each agent wins, but also
determines which agent can force the other one to win all of his items in the beginning and then win the
rest of the items. Suppose that the budget of agent 1 is fixed and the budget of agent 2 is monotonically
increasing. The outcome changes as follows. Say agent 2 is winning the first few items initially. At some
point his budget becomes large enough that he can force agent 1 to win the items first, while keeping the
number of items won the same. As his budget increases further, there is once again a transition point where
agent 2 can win one more item, but now has to move back to winning items first. The pattern then continues
until he can win all the items. There may be some discontinuity at the transition points since tie breaking
rules come into effect.
1.1 Related Work
Although many variants of sequential auctions with budget constrained bidders have been considered, they
are all limited to just two rounds. The seminal paper of Pitchik and Schotter (1986) considered sequential
auctions with two (non-identical) items and two budgeted constrained bidders with additive valuation over
the items. They characterize the equilibria of this game in the complete information setting and prove certain
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properties. They followed it up with an experimental validation of the decreasing prices phenomenon in
Pitchik and Schotter (1988). Additional empirical evidence of decreasing prices was provided in Ashenfelter
(1989). In Benoît and Krishna (2001) the agents have a common value for 2 non identical items with
combinatorial valuations. Rodriguez (2009) constructs equilibrium with declining prices for sequential
auction with multiple agents under the assumption of decreasing marginal utility. An isolated example of
sequential auctions in the context of ad-auctions is Iyengar et al. (2006). They also consider two rounds
and their results are dominating strategies for bidders participating in such auctions. Some examples of
sequential auctions in settings other than budget constrained bidders are Black and Meza (1992), Hassidim
et al. (2011), Jeitschko (1999), McAfee and Vincent (1993), Paes Leme et al. (2012), Weber (1981). Budget
constraints have also been considered in the setting of simultaneous (vs. sequential) auction design by
Bhattacharya et al. (2010), Borgs et al. (2005), Che and Gale (1998, 2000), Dobzinski et al. (2011).
Our model is also similar to some of the literature on contests such as Robson (2005), but there are
crucial differences. For instance, the problem considered by Robson (2005) is as follows: for one item, if
the two bidders bid x and y, then they both pay their respective bids and the result is that bidder 1 wins
with probability xr/(xr + yr) where 0 < r ≤ 1 is some parameter, and bidder 2 wins with the remaining
probability. Plus there is no sequentiality in his model. These make a huge difference; in his model the
equilibrium can be easily solved for and a closed form expression for equilibrium bids is derived. In fact, if
the items are identical (as in our model), then his solution is simply to divide the budgets equally among all
items. This is very different from the equilibrium behavior in our model as can be seen from Tables 1 and 2.
1.2 Techniques and Difficulties
The simplest of all the properties we prove is that the number of items won is approximately proportional
to the budgets. Let the total number of rounds be k and the budgets of the agents be B1 and B2. Suppose
agent 1 bids B2/k2 in every round, for some integer k2 ∈ [0, k]. Agent 2 can afford to win at most k2 items
with this strategy. Therefore agent 1 could ensure k1 := min{k − k2, B1k2/B2} items. Optimizing the
choice of k1, agent 1 can ensure he wins k1 items for the highest integer k1 for which k1 + k2 = k and
B1/k1 ≥ B2/k2.
The major difficulty comes (naturally) from understanding the interplay between individual auctions
resulting from the shared budget across them. The central question is what the outcome of the current
auction means to an agent in terms of later rounds. Intuitively, it seems sensible that a winning agent
always prefers to pay as little as possible, while a losing agent prefers the winner’s payment to be as high as
possible. Thus, in order to understand the outcome of our auctions, we need to understand how the utility
from a sequence of k auctions behaves as a function of the remaining budgets. Unfortunately the structure
of the utility function is rather complicated. While an agent’s utility from the current round is still linear
in the payment for the current round, there is no guarantee that the role the payment plays in reducing the
budget for future rounds is also linear – and in fact, analyzing even cases with few items makes it clear that
it is not. Analyzing small cases, i.e. k = 1, 2, 3 shows that while it does start out simple, adding more items
quickly makes the function very complicated. This can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2.
It is interesting to compare sequential auctions with unit-demand bidders and budget constrained bidders.
Unit-demand bidders only want one copy of the item, as long as the price is less than their valuation of the
item. In one round of a sequential auction with unit-demand bidders, only the identity of the winner in
that round matters to the remaining bidders. The subgame only depends on the remaining bidders. This
can be interpreted as bidders having externalities on each other Paes Leme et al. (2012). In contrast, in a
sequential auction with budget constrained bidders, not only the identity of the winner but also the price
paid by her matters to the other bidder. The subgame and in particular the utility function depends on the
residual budgets.
First of all, in order to even talk about the utility, you need that the equilibrium is unique, which seems
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circular. We get around this by first defining a canonical outcome and consider the utilities of the agents
in this outcome. We identify certain key properties of the canonical outcome such as the monotonicity of
prices, the sequence of wins and the monotonicity and continuity of the utility function that help us show
that this outcome is indeed an equilibrium. We finally argue that this equilibrium is essentially unique. The
proof that the canonical outcome is an equilibrium is by a joint induction on all the properties mentioned.
The proof of each of these properties depends intricately on the others, inductively. This is summarized in
Section 3.
The essence of all this is that any one round looks like a single item auction in the sense that for each
agent there is a critical price above which he prefers to lose that item and below which he prefers to win
it. (At the critical price she could either have a strict preference for winning over losing or be indifferent.)
Monotonicity of prices as the auction progresses is shown by supposing for the sake of contradiction that the
price of the first item is less than that of the second2 and showing that this leads to a profitable deviation for
the loser of the first item. This leads to a contradiction since (inductively) we have shown that the outcome
must be an equilibrium. The construction of such a profitable deviation itself relies inductively on other
properties. The sequence of wins, that is that one agent wins all the items in the beginning followed by the
other agent winning the rest of the items, is also proved by contradiction via a profitable deviation. The
utility function is discontinuous at the points of transition where an agent can afford to win one extra item.
We need to show that this discontinuity propagates in a controlled manner, all of which makes the whole
proof quite technically challenging.
Organization In Section 2 we give formal definitions of the game, the notions of equilibria we consider
and analyze the cases with a few items. We give the construction of the canonical outcome, the properties
on which we do the joint induction to prove that this outcome is an equilibrium and their dependence on
each other in Section 3. In Section 4 we give proof sketches of some of the important steps in the induction.
Section 5 contains a comparison of the outcome of the sequential auction and that of the adaptive clinching
auction. Section 6 discusses extensions and future work. The full proof is in Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries
Problem definition Suppose a central principal wants to auction k identical items to two budget con-
strained agents by running k first-price sealed-bid auctions in a sequential manner. We seek to understand
the equilibrium allocation and prices of this sequential auction. Here, we define an agent’s utility to be the
valuation of the items she gets plus her remaining budget at the end of the auction. If the budget is exceeded
then the utility is negative infinity. Note that this is not the standard definition of quasi-linear utilities. Using
this definition of utilities is essential for obtaining the natural monotonicity of utilities with respect to the
budgets, which will play an important role in our proofs.
Further, we let Bi denote the budget of agent i and let vi denote the value of agent i for winning each
item. We will assume that the values are the dominant factor in the sense that the agents’ primary goal is to
maximize the number of items that they get in the sequential auction. Minimizing the total price paid for
the items is only a secondary goal, conditioned on getting the same number of items. More precisely, we
will enforce this assumption by assuming v1, v2 > 2kB1, 2kB2. In this case, any change in the prices will
be overcompensated by even a tiny chance of getting an extra item. We consider the complete information
case, that is, we assume that each agent knows all the valuations and the budgets.
Formally, this is an instance of an extensive game with complete information and simultaneous moves.
(See Mas-Colell et al. (1995) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for a formal definition.) In each round, both
the agents move simultaneously and submit a bid. The outcome is a first-price auction: an item is awarded to
2This is the only case that we have to consider, by induction.
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the agent with the higher bid and the amount of his bid is deducted from his budget. For technical reason, we
will allow each agent i to bid b and b+ for each 0 ≤ b < Bi, where bidding b+ means bidding infinitesimally
larger than b. If one agent bids b and the other agent bids b+ then the agent bidding b+ wins the item and
is charged b. This treatment is essential for the existence of Nash equilibrium in the first price auction and
therefore essential for the sequential auction. See Paes Leme et al. (2012), for example, for other use of
this treatment in the literature. Finally if both agents bid the same, then the item is awarded to an agent
uniformly at random.
The natural solution concept for such games is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Given any partial history
of an extensive game, the remainder of the game is yet another extensive game, called a subgame of the
original game. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the extensive game such that for
any partial history of the game, the induced strategies of the Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the
induced subgame. Intuitively, this requires that given what has already occurred, each player acts rationally
with respect to the remainder of the game. This rules out agents playing threats that are not credible.
Equilibrium refinement The sequential auction we consider has unnatural subgame perfect equilibria.
So we consider refinements of the solution concept that rule out such equilibria. For instance, in a first-price
sealed-bid auction of a single item where the agents’ values are v1 > v2, agent 1 bidding b+ and agent 2
bidding b is an equilibrium for any v1 > b ≥ v2. However, we want to rule out the unnatural equilibria
where b > v2 because in these equilibria agent 2 bids above her value.
A widely-used refinement for finite games is the trembling-hand-perfection originally proposed in Selten
(1975), which is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Trembling-Hand-Perfection). An equilibrium strategy profile (σ, τ) of a two-player finite game
G is trembling-hand-perfect if there exists a sequence {(σj , τj)}j of completely mixed strategy profiles such
that (σj , τj) converges (σ, τ) as j goes to infinity, and σ is a best reply to every τj , and τ is a best reply to
every σj in the sequence.
Here, a completely mixed strategy profile is one in which every strategy of every player is played with
some positive probability. The positive, and presumably tiny, probability of playing strategies that are not in
the equilibrium profile corresponds to the fact that players make small mistakes from time to time (trembling
hand). So what trembling-hand-perfection indicates is that the equilibrium strategy profile is robust to such
small mistakes in the sense that using the equilibrium strategy maximizes the agent’s utility even if we
assume the other agent makes small mistakes.
Note that this is not the standard definition of trembling-hand-perfection in the literature. We choose
this definition because it is more convenient for our discussion. See Selten (1975) for the standard definition
of trembling-hand-perfection and the equivalence of the different definitions.
Despite the many appealing properties of trembling-hand-perfection in finite games, there is no well-
accepted definition of trembling-hand-perfection in the literature for games with continuous strategy space
such as the sequential auctions in this paper. Moreover, if we use the definition of finite games directly,
then trembling-hand-perfect equilibria may not exist. Indeed, a trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium may not
exists even for the first-price auction with a single item and two agents. Suppose the values are v1 > v2.
Then, consider the equilibrium agent 1 bidding v2+ and agent 2 bidding v2 (it is easy to rule out the other
equilibria). But bidding v2 is dominated by bidding v2−  for agent 2: if both cases lose, then they yield the
same utility; if bidding v2 wins and bidding v2− loses, then winning at v2 is still dominated because it yield
utility zero; finally if both cases win, then bidding v2 −  is strictly better because it pays less. Therefore,
this cannot be a trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium because folklore result asserts the strategy of each agent
in a trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium must be non-dominated.
A commonly used remedy to the absence of a theory for trembling-hand-perfection in continuous games
is to consider a sequence of discretized version of the continuous game that converges to it, and then analyze
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the limit of the trembling-hand-perfect equilibria of the discretized games (e.g. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989),
Broecker (1990)). This approach, however, is very difficult to apply to games with complicated structures
such as the sequential auction with arbitrary number of items.
In order to settle this problem, we will use a slightly weaker equilibrium refinement, which we refer to
as the semi-trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Semi-Trembling-Hand-Perfection). An equilibrium strategy profile (σ, τ) of a two-player
game G is semi-trembling-hand-perfect if there exists a sequence {(σj , τj)}j of completely mixed strate-
gies such that (σj , τj) converges to (σ, τ), and the best reply to σj converges to τ , and the best reply to τj
converges to σ as j goes to infinity.
As we can see by comparing Definition 2 and Definition 1, the notion of semi-trembling-hand-perfection
is still trying to model the robustness of the equilibrium strategies with respect to small mistakes made by
the agents, but in a weaker sense: when the other agent makes small mistakes, we no longer require the
best reply to be exactly the equilibrium strategy; however, the best reply has to converge to the equilibrium
strategy as the other agent makes fewer and fewer mistakes.
We will construct a subgame-perfect equilibrium that is unique after the refinement of semi-trembling-
hand-perfection.
2.1 Warm-up: Few-item cases
Let us first examine the cases with only 1, 2 or 3 items in order to build our intuition for the problem.
k = 1 First of all, let us consider the simplest case of a single item. In this case, the problem becomes
the classic first price auction. Therefore, suppose the agent values are B1 < B2, then the unique Nash
equilibrium that survives the iterated elimination of dominated strategies is where agent 1 bidsB1 and agent
2 bids B+1 and wins the item. In the case of B1 = B2, both agent will bid their budgets and we have a tie.
k = 2 Next, let us move on to the more interesting case of a two-item sequential auction. In order to
examine how the allocation of items changes as the ratio between the budgets changes, let us fix B2 = 1
and gradually increase B1 starting from 0.
If B1 < 12 , then agent 2 has enough budget to get both items. Since the value of a single item dominates
any changes in the payment, agent 2 wins both items by bidding B+1 in both rounds.
If 12 < B1 < 1, then agent 1 can guarantee herself an item by bidding B1 in both rounds. So the best
strategy for agent 2 is to let agent 1 win the first item and pay the highest possible price. There are two
types of credible threats that agent 2 could use to set the price for the first item. The first threat is to offer
agent 1 the first item at price B2 − B1, threatening that if agent 2 wins the first item at this price then she
has sufficient budget remaining to win the second item as well. The second threat is to offer the first item
at price B12 , threatening that if agent 1 do not take the first item at this price then she would need to pay a
higher price in order to win the second item.
Agent 2 uses the larger of these two threats to set the price in round 1. If 12 < B1 <
2
3 , then agent 2 uses
the first threat. Agent 1 wins the first item at price B2 −B1 and agent 2 wins the second item paying agent
1’s remaining budget, 2B1 − B2. If 23 < B1 < 1, then agent 2 exploits the second threat. Agent 1 wins the
first item at price 12B1 and agent 2 wins the second item also at price
1
2B1.
By symmetry the case of B1 > 1 is identical with the roles of the agents swapped. The equilibrium
allocations in various cases are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1: Equilibrium strategies for k = 2
Phase Budget ratio (B1/B2) Round 1 Round 2
1 (0, 12) 2 wins at B1 2 wins at B1
2 (12 ,
2
3) 1 wins at B2 −B1 2 wins at 2B1 −B2
3 (23 , 1) 1 wins at
1
2B1 2 wins at
1
2B1
k = 3 The case with three items is much more complicated in the sense that there are more possibilities
of allocation sequences. Here we briefly demonstrate these different allocation sequences and the intuition
behind them. Again, we fix the budget of agent 2 to be B2 = 1 and gradually increase agent 1’s budget
starting from 0.
The first phase is when B1 < 13 , where agent 2 has enough budget to win all three items by bidding B
+
1
in all three rounds.
The second phase is when 13 < B1 <
3
8 , where agent 1 has enough budget to obtain one item. In this
phase, agent 2 forces agent 1 to get the first item at price B1 − 2B2 and win the next two items cheaply
paying agent 1’s remaining budget. The threat used by agent 2 is that she could win the remaining two items
as well if agent 1 does not accept this offer. If agent 2 gets the first item at this price, then the induced
subgame falls into phase 1 of the two-item case.
The third phase is when 38 < B1 <
1
2 , where agent 2 forces agent 1 to get the first item at price
1
4B2 via a different threat: if agent 2 wins the first item at this price, then the induced subgame falls into
phase 2 of the two-item case. In fact the threshold at which the induced subgame falls into phase 2 of
the two-item case is B2 − 32B1. However for this to be a credible threat by agent 2, she must weakly
prefer winning the item at this price to losing it. On the one hand, the utility of agent 2 for winning the
first item at some price p, assuming that the induced subgame falls into phase 2 of the two-item case, is
2v2 +B2 − p− (2B1 − (B2 − p)) = 2v2 + 2B2 − 2B1 − 2p. On the other hand, the utility of agent 2 for
losing the first item at price p is 2v2 + B2 − 2(B1 − p) = 2v2 + B2 − 2B1 + 2p. The price p = 14B2 is
obtained by equating the two and solving 2v2 + 2B2 − 2B1 − 2p = 2v2 +B2 − 2B1 + 2p.
The rest of the phases are similar in spirit to the above. In the fourth phase, agent 2 forces agent 1 to get
the first item at price 12B1, threatening that if she wins the item at this price then the induced subgame falls
into phase 3 of the two-item case. In the fifth to the seventh phases, it is still the case that agent 1 gets one
item and agent 2 gets two. However, agent 1 now has enough budget to be in the dominant position in the
price competition. So agent 1 forces agent 2 to pay higher prices for the first two items and then wins the
last item, paying agent 2’s remaining budget. Depending on the budget of agent 1, the prices she can set are
determined by the phases in the two-item subgame they would end up in, if she wins the first item at those
prices. We do not discuss further details of these threats but summarize the outcomes in Table 2.
Observations We end this section with a few observations regarding the equilibrium outcomes discussed
above.
1. First of all, agent 1 and agent 2 get k1 and k2 items respectively (k1 + k2 = k) if and only if the
budgets satisfy k1k2+1 <
B1
B2
< k1+1k2 .
3 Intuitively, these conditions can be interpreted as follows: if the
average price an agent, say, agent 1, can afford for k1 items is strictly greater than the average price
agent 2 can afford for k2 + 1 items, then agent 1 can guarantee winning k1 items. For instance, agent
1 could keep bidding B1k1 .
3We omit the boundary cases B1
B2
= k1
k2+1
here. As we will see in the next section, in these boundary cases the agents keep
making the same bids until one of them runs out of budget. We handle these cases separately.
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Table 2: Equilibrium strategies for k = 3
Budget ratio (B1/B2) Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
(0, 13) 2 wins at B1 2 wins at B1 2 wins at B1
(13 ,
3
8) 1 wins at B2 − 2B1 2 wins at 3B1 −B2 2 wins at 3B1 −B2
(38 ,
1
2) 1 wins at
1
4B2 2 wins at B1 − 14B2 2 wins at B1 − 14B2
(12 ,
2
3)
1 1 wins at 12B1 2 wins at
1
2B1 2 wins at
1
2B1
(23 ,
5
6) 2 wins at
1
3B2 2 wins at
1
3B2 1 wins at
1
3B2
(56 ,
9
10) 2 wins at B1 − 12B2 2 wins at 34B2 − 12B1 1 wins at 34B2 − 12B1
( 910 , 1) 2 wins at B1 − 12B2 2 wins at 2B1 − 32B2 1 wins at 3B2 − 3B1
1 In this case, due to a tie in the first round, it could also be that agent 2 wins the first item at price 1
2
B1, agent 1 wins the second
item at price 1
2
B1, and agent 2 wins the last item at price 12B1. Since the agents get the same number of items at the same prices
in both the outcomes, we will break ties in some particular way in order to get more consistent structures, which are explained in
more details in the next section.
2. It is not difficult to verify that in each of the phases of different allocation sequences, the prices of the
items are non-increasing in the number of rounds.
3. Intriguingly, it is always the case that one of the agents wins her share of the items and then the other
agent wins the rest of the items. In other words, there are no interleaving of winners as one might
imagine.
4. Finally, we can easily examine that the utility of an agent in the equilibrium is monotonically in-
creasing in the agent’s budget and non-increasing in the budget of the other agent. Although this
observation seems intuitive, an example in Benoît and Krishna (2001) indicates that the utilities might
not be monotone in the agents’ budgets. However, in Benoît and Krishna (2001) the utility is defined
as the total value of the items an agent gets minus the total price that she pays. Indeed, with this
definition, an agent’s utility could counter-intuitively decrease as her budget increases. For instance,
suppose we fix agent 2’s budget to be 1 and gradually increases agent 1’s budget from 23 to 1 in the
two-item case. Agent 1 always gets one item but agent 2 forces agent 1 to pay higher and higher price
for the item as agent 1’s budget increases. In this paper, we use a different notion, an agent’s utility
is defined to be the total value of the items she gets plus the remaining budget that she has at the end.
With this definition, we can show the desired monotonicity, which plays a crucial role in our analysis.
3 General Case
In this section, we consider the general case of arbitrary number of items and outline the proof structure and
the high level ideas. The easiest part of the whole proof is showing how the number of items won by each
agent in any equilibrium depends on the budgets. The intuition is that the number of items an agent wins
should be approximately proportional to his budget. Consider k1k−k1+1 as a function of k1 and observe that it
is monotonically increasing. So there must exists a unique k1 ∈ Z≥0 such that k1k−k1+1 ≤ B1B2 < k1+1k−k1 . If we
let k2 = k − k1, then either k1k2+1 < B1B2 < k1+1k2 , or k1k2+1 = B1B2 . We will handle these two cases separately
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as follows.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 satisfy k1+k2 = k and k1k2+1 < B1B2 < k1+1k2 . Then, in any subgame
perfect equilibrium of the sequential auction, agent 1 gets k1 items and agent 2 gets k2 items.
Proof. Regardless of the strategy of agent 2, agent 1 can guarantee k1 items for herself by bidding B1k1 until
her budget is exhausted. This is because at this price, agent 2 can afford to win at most k2 items after which
her remaining budget is strictly less than B1k1 . Therefore any outcome in which agent 1 gets less than k1
items cannot be an equilibrium regardless of the price paid, since we assumed that v1 > B1. By symmetry
agent 2 gets at least k2 items in any equilibrium. Since k1 + k2 = k, it must be the case that agent 1 gets
exactly k1 items and agent 2 gets exactly k2 items.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 satisfy k1 + k2 = k and k1k2+1 = B1B2 . Then, in any equilibrium,
agent 1 gets at least k1 − 1 items and agent 2 gets at least k2 items. (The tie-breaking comes into effect for
the extra item.)
The proof of this proposition is essentially the same as that of Proposition 3.1.
3.1 Canonical Outcome
We now construct a canonical outcome of the game. The heart of the proof is showing that this is a subgame
perfect equilibrium. This involves exploiting several other properties of this outcome. We then show that
under the refinement of semi-trembling-hand-perfection this is the only equilibrium.
The canonical outcome is defined recursively. We start with the single-item case and assume w.l.o.g. that
B1 ≥ B2. In this case, the sequential auction is simply the first-price sealed-bid auction.
Canonical Outcome (base case): The canonical outcome for a single-item is agent 1 bidding
B2+ and agent 2 bidding B2 if B1 > B2, and both agents bidding B1 = B2 otherwise.
Suppose we have defined the canonical outcome for k − 1 or fewer items. In order to recursively define
the canonical outcome for k items, we need some definitions. We use i and −i to denote agents. If i is 1
then −i is 2 and vice versa.
Definition 3 (Utility). Let U (k)i (Bi, B−i) denote the utility (expected utility in case tie-breaking comes into
effect) of agent i in the canonical outcome when the budgets are Bi and B−i.
Definition 4 (Winning Utility). LetW (k)i (Bi, B−i, p)
def
= vi+U
(k−1)
i (Bi−p,B−i) denote the winning utility
of agent i, that is, the utility when agent i wins the first item at price p and both agents follow the canonical
outcome in the remaining sequential auction with k − 1 items.
Definition 5 (Losing Utility). Let L(k)i (Bi, B−i, p)
def
= U (k−1)(Bi, B−i−p) denote the losing utility of agent
i, that is, the utility when agent i wins the first item at price p and both agents follow the canonical outcome
in the remaining sequential auction with k − 1 items.
We now state a monotonicity property of these functions which is used in the recursive definition of the
canonical outcome. This property is proved along with other properties later.
Proposition 3.3. U (k)i (Bi, B−i) is increasing in Bi, and non-increasing in B−i.
Proposition 3.4. W (k)i (Bi, B−i, p) is decreasing in p while L
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) is non-decreasing in p, and
both are increasing in Bi and non-increasing in B−i.
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It is easy to see that Proposition 3.3 implies Proposition 3.4. Given the monotonicity in Proposition 3.4,
we define the critical prices of the agents for the first round.
Definition 6 (Critical Prices). There exists a unique price p(k)i s.t. for any p > p
(k)
i , W
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) <
L
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p), and for any p < p
(k)
i , W
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) > L
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p). We will refer to p
(k)
i as the
critical price of agent i. 4
The definition of critical prices is identical to the definition of critical values in Pitchik and Schotter
(1986) for the two-item case. Here, we extend the definition to arbitrary number of items. The critical price
p
(k)
i is similar, although not identical, to an agent’s valuation in the single-item auction in the following
sense: agent i is willing to get the first item at any price lower than the critical price p(k)i , while she has no
interest in winning the first item at a price higher than p(k)i . Note that one or both of W
(k)
i and L
(k)
i could be
discontinuous at p(k)i . So the monotonicity in Proposition 3.4 does not have further indication on whether
agent i prefers winning or losing the first item at price p(k)i . In the later sections, we do show that an agent
weakly prefers winning to losing at the critical price. In order to show this, we will need to utilize a few
subtle structures of the canonical outcome.
We are now ready to complete the construction of the canonical outcome.
Canonical Outcome (recursive step): Suppose that the canonical outcome is defined for k −
1 items and we have computed the critical prices. Assume w.l.o.g that p(k)i ≥ p(k)−i . Then,
the canonical outcome of the k-item case is agent i bidding p(k)−i+ and agent −i bidding p(k)−i
and both agents following the canonical outcome in the subgame of k − 1 items, if p(k)i >
p
(k)
−i . Otherwise, the canonical outcome is both agents bidding p
(k)
i = p
(k)
−i and following the
canonical outcome in the resulting subgame of k − 1 items.
3.2 Properties of the Canonical Equilibrium
The main structural theorem in this paper is the following.
Theorem 3.5. The canonical outcome is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential auction with k
items.
The proof of this theorem is by a joint induction on Proposition 3.3 and several other properties of
canonical outcomes. We now detail these properties and specify how the proof of each of these properties
inductively depends on the others.
The next two properties characterize which agent wins which round in the canonical outcome of the
sequential auctions and the monotonicity of the prices paid in the canonical outcome.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 satisfy k1+ k2 = k and k1k2+1 ≤ B1B2 < k1+1k2 . Based on the different
cases, the following happens in the canonical outcome:
Case 1 (Type I tie-breaking) k1k2+1 =
B1
B2
. In this case, both agents will keep bidding p∗ def= B1k1 =
B2
k2+1
until one of the agents runs out of her budget, and then the other agent will win the rest of the items
for free.
Case 2 k1k2+1 <
B1
B2
< k1+1k2+1 . In this case, agent 1 wins the first k1 items and then agent 2 wins the rest.
1
4We note that it might be the case that even if p achieves its maximum value Bi, we still have W
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) >
L
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p). But it is not difficult to prove this can only happen when Bi <
B−i
k
, in which case it is clear agent −i
will win all the items paying Bi per item. We will omit this trivial case in our discussion and assume pi always exists.
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Case 3 (Type II-A tie-breaking) B1B2 =
k1+1
k2+1
. In this case, both agents will keep bidding p∗ def= B1k1+1 =
B2
k2+1
until one of the agent’s budget becomes p∗, and then the other agent will get the remaining items
by bidding p∗+. 2
Case 4 k1+1k2+1 <
B1
B2
< k1+1k2 . In this case agent 2 wins the first k2 items and then agent 1 wins the rest.
1
1 When B1
B2
is sufficiently close to k1+1
k2+1
, we may end up in another type tie-breaking case. However, in this tie-breaking case, we
can assume w.l.o.g. the allocation is as asserted in Proposition 3.6 without changing the agents’ utilities. We will explain in details
in Appendix A. Such treatment will be convenient for our proofs.
2 In this tie-breaking case, we can assume either agent 1 gets the first k1 items and then agent 2 gets the remaining k2 items, or
the other way around, without changing the utilities of the agents. Such treatment will be convenient for our proofs.
Proposition 3.7. The prices paid in each round of the canonical outcome is non-increasing as the auction
proceeds.
Finally, we will also show the following property about the continuity of the utility functions in the
agents’ budgets.
Proposition 3.8. For i = 1, 2, U (k)i is continuous in both Bi and B−i, except when
Bi
B−i =
ki
k−i+1 for
ki, k−i ∈ Z≥0 such that ki + k−i = k. Moreover,
lim
B−i→ k−i+1ki B
−
i
U
(k)
i (Bi, B−i) = kivi , lim
B−i→ k−i+1ki B
+
i
U
(k)
i (Bi, B−i) = (ki − 1)vi +Bi
lim
Bi→ kik−i+1B
−
−i
U
(k)
i (Bi, B−i) = (ki − 1)vi +
ki
k−i + 1
B−i , lim
Bi→ kik−i+1B
−
−i
U
(k)
i (Bi, B−i) = kivi
If BiB−i =
ki
k−i+1 , then the tie-breaking comes into effect and the utilities are random variables. We can
calculate the expected utilities, and these are summarized later.
Dependencies For the sake of presentation, we will let P(k)1 denote Theorem 3.5 for k items. Let P(k)2
denote Proposition 3.6 for k items. Let P(k)3 denote Proposition 3.7 for k items. Let P(k)4 and P(k)5 denote
Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.8 respectively. The joint induction proceeds by assuming each of the
properties P(k−1)1 to P(k−1)5 and proving properties P(k)1 to P(k)5 . The dependencies are summarized below:
P(k)1 depends on P(k−1)1 , P(k−1)4 , and P(k−1)5 .
P(k)2 depends on P(k)1 , P(k−1)4 , and P(k−1)5 .
P(k)3 depends on P(k)1 , P(≤k)2 , P(k−1)4 , and P(k−1)5 ;
P(k)4 and P(k)5 depend on P(k−1)4 , P(k−1)5 , and P(k)2 .
3.3 Uniqueness of equilibrium
Note that when p(k)i > p
(k)
−i (or symmetrically the other way around), we face the problem of equilibrium
section. We can argue that agent i bidding p(k)−i+ and agent −i bidding p(k)−i is the only “stable” equilibrium
in the sense that it is the unique semi-trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Proof sketch of uniqueness of the canonical equilibrium by analyzing the dynamic of the game.
Proposition 3.9. The canonical equilibrium is the unique semi-trembling-hand-perfect and subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
The analysis is very similar to the equilibrium refinement in a first price auction and therefore we will
defer the proof to Appendix B. Here we will give an informal explanation by presenting the dynamic of the
game in Figure 1. Suppose w.l.o.g. that p(k)1 > p
(k)
2 , and agent 1 bids b1 and agent 2 bids b2. If b1 > b2 and
b1 > p
(k)
2 , then agent 1 wants to decease her bid while agent 2 has no incentive of changing her strategy. If
b1 < b2 and b2 > p
(k)
1 , then agent 1 has no incentive to change her bid while agent 2 wants to decrease her
bid to lose the item. If b1 < b2 < p
(k)
1 , then agent 1 wants to increase her bid to wins the item while agent 2
wants to decrease her bid to lower the price. Finally, if b2 < b1 < p
(k)
2 , then agent 1 wants to decrease her
bid to lower the price, while agent 2 wants to increase her bid to win the item. Summarizing these cases, it
is easy to see the only “stable” point is agent 1 bidding p(k)2 + and agent 2 bidding p
(k)
2 .
3.4 First-price vs. second-price
We can also consider the second-price version of the sequential auction, where the winner and the price are
chosen using the second-price rule in each round: the agent with the higher bid wins and pays the other
agent’s bid.
In the second-price version, the canonical outcome we construct in this paper is still a subgame-perfect
equilibrium, via almost identical arguments. However, it is no longer the stable one because underbidding is
weakly-dominated under the second-price rule. In the second-price auction of a single item, truthful bidding
is a stable equilibrium as it is a dominant-strategy equilibrium. We can use the critical-price methodology
in this paper to analyze the case of multiple items. Roughly speaking, when it comes to 2 or more items,
the agent with the lower critical price may have incentive to overbid (unlike the single-item case) in order
to deplete the other agent’s budget. In such case, the first-round bids in the equilibria must be the winner
bidding b+ while the loser bidding b for some b between the critical prices. Further, since underbidding
is weakly-dominated in the second-price rule, in the stable equilibrium b must equal the higher one of the
critical prices. In other words, it is conceivable that the stable equilibrium is both agent bidding the higher
one of the agents’ critical prices in each round, rather than the lower one as in the first-price version. This
observation is implicitly proved for the value-dominant case of two items in Pitchik and Schotter (1986).
Also, see Pitchik and Schotter (1988) for experimental results comparing the first-price and second-price
sequential auctions. We shall not discuss any further the second-price version but leave it as an interesting
open question to study the equilibrium of the second-price sequential auction.
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4 Proof Sketches
In this section, we will sketch the proofs of some of the important implications outlined in Section 3. The
complete joint induction of these claims is in Appendix A.
4.1 Two-Phase Winner Sequence
Consider the two-phase winner sequence described in Proposition 3.6. The simplest case is the type I tie-
breaking, which we restate and prove as follows.
Proposition 4.1 (Type I tie-breaking). Suppose k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 satisfy k1 + k2 = k and k1k2+1 = B1B2 . Then,
in the canonical outcome, both agents keep bidding p∗ def= B1k1 =
B2
k2+1
until one agent is out of budget, and
then the other agent wins the rest for free.
Proof. Intuitively, this is the case where the budget ratio lies at the intersection of the region where agent
1 gets k1 items and agent 2 gets k2 items and the region where agent 1 gets k1 − 1 items and agent 2 gets
k2 + 1 items. In other words, agent 1 can guarantee k1 − 1 items and agent 2 can guarantee k2 items for
sure, and both agents are competing for the extra item by keep bidding the highest rational bid they have.
Now we formally prove the claim. We first prove that p(k)1 = p
(k)
2 = p
∗. Consider any price p∗ + 
for sufficiently small  > 0. It is easy to verify that k1−2k2+2 <
B1−p−
B2
< k1−1k2+1 and
k1
k2
< B1B2−p− <
k1+1
k2−1
when  is sufficiently small. So by Proposition 3.6, if agent 1 wins the first item at price p∗ + , then in the
subgame she only gets k1 − 2 items and thus k1 − 1 items in total; on the other hand, if agent 1 loses the
first item at price p∗+ , then in the subgame she gets k1 items. Therefore, we have W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p
∗+ ) <
L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p
∗+ ) since v1  B1. So by the definition of p(k)1 we have p(k)1 ≤ p∗. Similarly, we can show
p
(k)
1 ≥ p∗. So we have p(k)1 = p∗. Via an almost identical proof we can show that p(k)2 = p∗.
Now note that B1−p
∗
B2
= k1−1k2+1 and
B1
B2−p∗ =
k1
k2
. So we can recursively apply the same argument in the
subgames to finish the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Next, we sketch the proof of the other three cases. We first clarify the tie-breaking case described in the
footnote of Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 satisfy k1 + k2 = k and kik−i+1 <
Bi
B−i ≤
ki+1
k−i+1 . Then, in the
canonical outcome it is always the case that agent i wins the first ki items, and then agent −i gets the
remaining k−i items paying agent i’s remaining budget for each item. Here, there are two tie-breaking
caveats:
Type II-A Tie-breaking If B1B2 =
k1+1
k2+1
, then in the canonical outcome both agents keep bidding p∗ def=
B1
k1+1
= B2k2+1 until one agent’s budget becomes p
∗, and then the other agent gets the remaining item
by bidding p∗+.
In this tie-breaking case, we can assume either agent 1 gets the first k1 items and then agent 2 gets
the remaining k2 items, or the other way around, without changing the utilities of the agents.
Type II-B Tie-breaking If BiB−i is smaller than and sufficiently close to
ki+1
k−i+1 , then in the canonical outcome
both agents keep bidding p∗ def= Biki+1 until either agent i gets ki items or agent −i gets k−i − 1 items.
In the former case, agent −i then wins the remaining items paying agent i’s remaining budget p∗.
In the latter case, agent i then keeps bidding p∗+ until she gets ki items, and then agent i wins the
remaining items paying agent i’s remaining budget p∗.
In this tie-breaking case, we can assume agent i gets ki items and then agent i gets the remaining k−i
items, without changing the utilities of the agents.
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Sketch of Proposition 4.2. Here we only show that one of the agent gets her share of the items first and then
the other agent gets the rest. Once we have shown this, it is easy to deduce who gets the items first.
Suppose for contradiction that agent 1 gets the first item paying p(k)2 , and then agent 2 gets the next k2
items, and finally agent 1 gets the rest. Briefly speaking, we first show that in this case, the first item must
be sold at a price that is lower than the average price that agent 1 pays. Then, we argue that since the first
item is so cheap, agent 1 must have a profitable deviation by winning the first item.
There will be several cases we need to consider in the complete proof. Here we describe one of the
cases. We assume the following: (1) no tie in the first round: p(k)1 > p
(k)
2 ; (2) agent 2 is indifferent between
winning and losing the first item at p(k)2 ; (3) if agent 2 wins the first item paying p
(k)
2 , then in the subgame
agent 2 wins the next k2 − 1 items and then agent 2 wins the rest.
By the second assumption, agent 2 has the same remaining budget regardless of whether she wins the
first item or not. If agent 2 wins the first item, agent 1 gets k1 items at price equal to agent 2’s remaining
budget. If agent 1 wins the first item, then agent 1 gets k1 − 1 items at a price equal to agent 2’s remaining
budget, and one item at price p(k)2 . Further, agent 1 must strictly prefer winning the first item. Therefore, p
(k)
2
must be strictly smaller than agent 2’s remaining budget. Now by the price monotonicity (Proposition 3.7)
of k − 1 items, p(k)2 is strictly smaller than any other price in the assumed equilibrium. Now we have a
contradiction by constructing the following equilibrium. Agent 2 could win the first item paying a price
greater than p(k)2 but lower than the prices of the other items in the assumed equilibrium. Then, agent 2
could keep bidding p(k)2 until agent 1 gets at least one item, say item j
∗. Finally, agent 2 could follow the
canonical outcome thereafter. In the first j∗ rounds of this deviation, agent 1 gets one item at price p(k)2 , and
agent 2 gets j∗ − 1 items paying roughly p(k)2 per item. In the first j∗ rounds of the assumed equilibrium,
however, agent 1 also gets one item at price p(k)2 , and agent 2 gets j
∗ − 1 items paying strictly greater than
p
(k)
2 per item. Therefore, agent 2 is strictly better off in the deviation by the monotonicity of an agent’s
utility in her budget.
4.2 Monotonicity of Utilities
The complete proof of Proposition 3.3 requires a more detailed case analysis. Here we sketch the proof by
describing the analysis for one of the cases.
For the sake of the discussion here, we assume the following: (1) agent 1 wins the first item at agent 2’s
critical price in the canonical outcome; (2) agent 2 is indifferent between winning and losing the first item
at price p(k)2 ; (3) the above two assumptions still hold when agent 2’s budget increases from B2 to B2 + 
or when agent 1’s budget increases from B1 to B1 +  for sufficiently small  > 0; (4) we have inductively
proved Proposition 3.3 for the case of k − 1 items.
First, consider increasing agent 2’s budget fromB2 toB2+. Note that agent 2’s utility when her budget
is B2 is U
(k)
2 (B2, B1) = L
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p
(k)
2 ) = W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p
(k)
2 ) as she is indifferent between winning
and losing at price p(k)2 . Moreover, we have L
(k)
2 (B2 + , B1, p
(k)
2 ) > L
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p
(k)
2 ) = U
(k)
2 (B2, B1)
where we get the inequality by comparing the budgets after the first round when agent 2’s budget is B2 and
B2 + . Similarly, we have W
(k)
2 (B2 + , B1, p
(k)
2 ) > W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p
(k)
2 ) = U
(k)
2 (B2, B1). So by bidding
p
(k)
2 agent 2 could guarantee strictly more utility than U
(k)
2 (B2, B1) when her budget is B2+ . Thus, in the
canonical outcome agent 2’s utility will strictly increase when her budget increases.
Next, consider increasing agent 1’s budget from B1 to B1 + . We will let p′() denote the critical price
of agent 2 when agent 1’s budget is B1 +  instead of B1. We will show that p′() < p
(k)
2 + . Note that
L
(k)
2 (B2, B1 + , p
(k)
2 + ) = L
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p
(k)
2 ) because we will end up in the same subgame after the first
round in both cases. On the other hand, we have W (k)2 (B2, B1 + , p
(k)
2 + ) < W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p
(k)
2 ) by
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Table 3: Clinching auction outcomes for k = 2
Budget ratio (B1/B2) Round 1 Round 2
(0, 23) 2 wins at
B1
2 2 wins at B1
(23 , 1) 2 wins at
B1
2 1 wins at 1− B12
comparing the budgets after the first round in the two cases. So by our assumption that agent 2 is indifferent
at price p(k)2 when the budgets areB1 andB2, we haveL
(k)
2 (B2, B1+, p
(k)
2 +) > W
(k)
2 (B2, B1+, p
(k)
2 +).
Since agent 2 is indifferent at price p′() when agent 1’s budget is B1 + , we have p′() < p
(k)
2 + . Hence,
we get that
U
(k)
2 (B2, B1 + ) = U
(k−1)
2 (B2, B1 + − p′()) ≤ U (k−1)2 (B2, B1 − p(p)2 ) = U (k)2 (B2, B1) .
Therefore, we have proved the desired monotonicity for this case. The analysis of the other cases are
similar in spirit to the above arguments. But some special treatments are needed on a case-by-case basis.
The full proof is in Appendix A.
5 Comparison with the clinching auction
In this section we compare the outcome of the sequential auction with that of the clinching auction of
Ausubel (2004), as modified by Dobzinski et al. (2011) to accommodate budgets. At a high level, the
clinching auction proceeds as follows. It starts with a per-unit price of 0, and slowly raises this until some
agent becomes critical for keeping overall demand above supply, i.e. the total demand from other agents
drops below the supply. When this happens, we allocate to this agent at the current price, until the supply
is reduced back to below other agents’ total demand (this process is the “clinching” from the auction’s
name). We then return to slowly raising the per-unit price. This process continues until the supply has been
exhausted.
When analyzing sequential auctions, we focus on the case with just 2 bidders, both of whom have values
exceeding their budgets. In this case, the clinching auction simplifies to the following process: items are
allocated one-by-one, and at a given round, if there are k items left, and the remaining budgets of agents
1 and 2 are B1 and B2, respectively, an item is allocated to the agent with the higher budget at a price of
min(B1, B2)/k.
We begin by considering cases with small k, as we did with sequential auctions, and then present some
observations on the outcomes of the clinching auction for general k. For k = 1, we can see from the
description above that if B1 < B2 (without loss of generality), then agent 2 will simply win the single item
at a price of B1. Consider the case where k = 2, again assuming that B1 < B2. Then in the first round,
agent 2 wins the item at a price of B2/2; the outcome of the second round simply depends on whether or
not paying this price depletes agent 2’s budget below B1, i.e. whether or not B2 > 3B1/2. Note that this
induction is much simpler than the one for sequential auctions – once we know the budgets of the agents, we
may immediately infer the winner and payment in the current round, which tells us the budgets for the next
round. As such, we omit further details, and simply present the outcomes and prices for k = 2 and k = 3 in
Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.
We finish this section with some observations about the outcomes of the clinching auction for general k.
1. First, we observe that the order of allocation is quite different from that in the sequential auction.
While in the sequential auction winners are never interleaved, in the clinching auction winners are
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Table 4: Clinching auction outcomes for k = 3
Budget ratio (B1/B2) Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
(0, 611) 2 wins at
B1
3 2 wins at
B1
2 2 wins at B1
( 611 ,
3
4) 2 wins at
B1
3 2 wins at
B1
2 1 wins at 1− 5B16
(34 , 1) 2 wins at
B1
3 1 wins at
3−B1
6 2 wins at
5B1−3
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Figure 2: A comparison of how the sequential and clinching auctions compare in terms of the fraction of
items an agent can expect to receive as a function of the fraction of the total wealth they control under each.
nearly always interleaved. In particular, it is easy to verify that once there are two consecutive rounds
where the winning agent changes, the winner will change in every round thereafter. Thus, we find that
in general the clinching auction repeatedly allocates to the agent with the higher budget until the two
budgets are “close,” and then proceeds to alternate between the two agents.
2. Unlike sequential auctions, where the prices are non-increasing as we proceed to later rounds, the
very definition of the clinching auction ensures that prices with only increase as we proceed to later
rounds.
3. The fact that the clinching auction generally alternates between the two agents when allocating items
might give the impression that it is more “fair” than the sequential auction; considering how the
items are divided between the agents, however, gives a much different impression. In particular, the
clinching auction increases the number of items it allocates to agent 1 as B1 increases much more
quickly than the sequential auction does. For example, agent 1 cannot win all the items in a sequential
auction until B1 > k ·B2, but in the clinching auction does so with only B1 > Hk ·B2 ≈ log k ·B2.
More generally, if agent 1 controls a p-fraction of the total wealth (i.e. p = B1/(B1 + B2)), the
fraction of items agent 1 can expect to win is k1/k ≈ p under the sequential auction, but k1/k ≈
1 − exp(2p−1p−1 )/2 in the clinching auction. See Figure 2 for a graphical comparison of these two
quantities.
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6 Conclusion and future directions
As mentioned in the introduction, we consider the most basic setting of sequential auctions with budget
constrained bidders in order to analyze, for the first time, the case of arbitrary number of items. Now that
we understand this basic case, one can hope to extend it to more settings. In particular as “next steps”, the
following are interesting questions that our work raises.
• Even for the case of two bidders, we assume that the values are much bigger than the budgets, in
essence to ensure that the primary goal of the agents is to win as many items as possible and the price
paid is only a secondary goal. Can we extend our results to arbitrary valuations?
• A crucial property in our results was the sequence of wins. Even with 3 bidders, it is not clear how this
generalizes. How to extend our results to an arbitrary number of bidders is of course the big question.
• Another direction in which we can relax our model is to consider incomplete information. This would
become more interesting when the valuations are comparable to the budget.
Finally, we feel we are still far from a thorough understanding of even the two agent case presented here.
It would be insightful to further simplify the proof we currently have.
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A Joint Induction
A.1 Notations
As we will see later in this section, the probability trial of tossing (at most m + n + 1) coins until either
we get m + 1 head or we get n + 1 tails will play an important role in the tie-breaking cases of the equi-
librium. Therefore, we will define the following notation to denote the probability of getting n+ 1 tails for
presentation convenience.
Definition 7. For any m,n ∈ Z≥0, we let φ(m,n) denote the probability that we get at least n+ 1 heads if
we repeatedly toss a fair coin m+ n+ 1 times.
We will prove two straightforward properties of the probability φ(m,n).
Lemma A.1. For any m,n ∈ Z≥0,
φ(m,n) =
m∑
j=0
(
n+ j
n
)(
1
2
)n+j+1
.
Proof. First, the number of different head/tail sequences such that we get n heads and j tails in the first
n+ j tosses and get another head in the last toss is
(
n+j
n
)
. Each of these sequences happens with probability(
1
2
)n+j+1. So the probability that we get n+ 1 heads and before that get exactly j tails is (n+jn ) (12)n+j+1.
Summing up for j from 0 to m proves the lemma.
Lemma A.2. For any m,n ∈ Z such that m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0 we have
φ(m,n)− φ(m− 1, n+ 1) =
(
n+m+ 1
n+ 1
)(
1
2
)m+n+1
.
Proof. By the definition of φ, we have that φ(m,n)−φ(m−1, n+1) equals the probability that inm+n+1
tosses we get exactly n+ 1 heads. Note that there are
(
m+n+1
n+1
)
such head/tail sequences and each happens
with probability
(
1
2
)m+n+1. So we have proved the lemma.
A.2 Main Proof
Now let us present the joint inductive proof of Theorem 3.5, Proposition 4.2 (the elaborated version of
Proposition 3.6, Case 2 - 4) , Proposition 3.7, Proposition 3.3, and Proposition 3.8. First, let us restate and
clarify these claims as follows:
P(k)1 (Theorem 3.5) The canonical outcome is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential auction with
k items.
P(k)2 (Proposition 4.2) Suppose k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 satisfy k1+k2 = k and kik−i+1 <
Bi
B−i ≤
ki+1
k−i+1 . Then, in the
canonical outcome it is always the case that agent i wins the first ki items, and then agent −i gets the
remaining k−i items paying agent i’s remaining budget for each item. Here, there are two tie-breaking
caveats:
Type II-A Tie-breaking If B1B2 =
k1+1
k2+1
, then in the canonical outcome both agents keep bidding p∗ def=
B1
k1+1
= B2k2+1 until one agent’s budget becomes p
∗, and then the other agent gets the remaining
item by bidding p∗+.
In this tie-breaking case, we can assume either agent 1 gets the first k1 items and then agent 2
gets the remaining k2 items, or the other way around, without changing the utilities of the agents.
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Type II-B Tie-breaking If BiB−i is smaller than and sufficiently close to
ki+1
k−i+1 , then in the canonical
outcome both agents keep bidding p∗ def= Biki+1 until either agent i gets ki items or agent −i gets
k−i − 1 items. In the former case, agent −i then wins the remaining items paying agent i’s
remaining budget p∗. In the latter case, agent i then keeps bidding p∗+ until she gets ki items,
and then agent i wins the remaining items paying agent i’s remaining budget p∗.
In this tie-breaking case, we can assume agent i gets ki items and then agent i gets the remaining
k−i items, without changing the utilities of the agents.
P(k)3 (Proposition 3.7) The prices paid in each round of the canonical outcome is non-increasing as the
auction proceeds.
P(k)4 (Proposition 3.3) U (k)i (Bi, B−i) is increasing in Bi, and non-increasing in B−i.
P(k)5 (Proposition 3.8) U (k)i is continuous in bothBi andB−i, except when BiB−i =
ki
k−i+1 for ki, k−i ∈ Z≥0
such that ki + k−i = k. Moreover,
lim
B−i→ k−i+1ki B
−
i
U
(k)
i (Bi, B−i) = kivi ,
lim
B−i→ k−i+1ki B
+
i
U
(k)
i (Bi, B−i) = (ki − 1)vi +Bi ,
lim
Bi→ kik−i+1B
−
−i
U
(k)
i (Bi, B−i) = (ki − 1)vi +
ki
k−i + 1
B−i ,
lim
Bi→ kik−i+1B
−
−i
U
(k)
i (Bi, B−i) = kivi .
If BiB−i =
ki
k−i+1 , then
U
(k)
i (Bi, B−i) = (ki − 1)vi + φ(k−i, ki − 1)vi + φ(ki − 1, k−i)Bi − φ(ki − 2, k−i + 1)B−i .
Also, recall that the dependencies can be summarized as follows:
P(k)1 depends on P(k−1)1 , P(k−1)4 , and P(k−1)5 .
P(k)2 depends on P(k)1 , P(k−1)4 , and P(k−1)5 .
P(k)3 depends on P(k)1 , P(≤k)2 , P(k−1)4 , and P(k−1)5 .
P(k)4 and P(k)5 depend on P(k−1)4 , P(k−1)5 , and P(k)2 .
Base case These propositions in the case of 1 or 2 items are easy to verify from the discussions in Sec-
tion 2.1. So we will omit the tedious calculations here.
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Inductive step Let us move on to the inductive step. Suppose we have prove the propositions for the cases
of k−1 or less items. Now let us consider the case of k items. The rest of the section is organized as follows.
In Section A.2.1, we will verify the monotonicity and continuity of the winning and losing utilities (Propo-
sition 3.4) from the monotonicity and continuity of the utility functions of k − 1 items. In Section A.2.2,
we will prove the agents weakly prefer winning at the critical prices, which will be useful for the rest of the
proof. In Section A.2.3 we will prove that the canonical outcome is indeed a subgame-perfect equilibrium
(P(k−1)1 ,P(k−1)4 ,P(k−1)5 ⇒ P(k)1 ). In Section A.2.4, we will prove the two-phase winner sequence in the
canonical outcome (P(k−1)2 ,P(k−1)4 ,P(k−1)5 ,P(k)1 ⇒ P(k)2 ). In Section A.2.5, we will explain why the prices
paid for the items weakly declines as the action proceeds (P(k−1)3 ,P(k−1)4 ,P(k−1)5 ,P(k)1 ,P(≤k)2 ⇒ P(k)3 ).
Finally, in Section A.2.6, we will analyze the monotonicity and continuity of the utility function in the
sequential auction with k items (P(k−1)4 ,P(k−1)5 ,P(k)2 ⇒ P(k)4 ,P(k)5 ).
A.2.1 Monotonicity and Continuity of Winning and Losing Utility
In this step, we will establish the monotonicity and continuity of the winning and losing utilities of the
k-item sequential auction.
Lemma A.3 (Proposition 3.4 restated). W (k)i (Bi, B−i, p) is decreasing in p while L
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) is non-
decreasing in p, and both are increasing in Bi and non-increasing in B−i.
Lemma A.4. W (k)i and L
(k)
−i are continuous in p except when p = Bi − kik−iB−i for k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 such that
k1 + k2 = k. Moreover, we have
lim
p→(B−i− k−iki Bi)
−
L
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) = (ki − 1)vi +Bi ,
lim
p→(B−i− k−iki Bi)
+
L
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) = kivi ,
lim
p→(Bi− kik−iB−i)
−
W
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) = (ki + 1)vi ,
lim
p→(Bi− kik−iB−i)
+
W
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) = kivi +
ki
k−i
B−i .
of Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.4. By definition, we haveL(k)i (Bi, B−i, p) = U
(k−1)
i (Bi, B−i−p). Therefore,
by Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.8 of the k−1 item case we get the asserted monotonicity of L(k)i . Also,
we get that L(k)i is continuous in p except when p = B−i − kik−iBi for k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 s.t. k1 + k2 = k, and
lim
p→(B−i− k−iki Bi)
−
L
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) = lim
B→ k−i
ki
B+i
U
(k−1)
i (Bi, B) = (ki − 1)vi +Bi ,
lim
p→(B−i− k−iki Bi)
+
L
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) = lim
B→ k−i
ki
B−i
U
(k−1)
i (Bi, B) = kivi .
Similarly, W (k)i (Bi, B−i, p) = vi + U
(k−1)
i (Bi − p,B−i). So by Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.8
we have the desired monotonicity and its continuity in p except when B−i =
k−i
ki
(Bi − p) for k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0
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s.t. k1 + k2 = k, and
lim
p→(Bi− kik−iB−i)
−
W
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) = vi + lim
B→ ki
k−iB
+
−i
U
(k−1)
i (B,B−i) = (ki + 1)vi ,
lim
p→(Bi− kik−iB−i)
+
W
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) = vi + lim
B→ ki
k−iB
−
−i
U
(k−1)
i (B,B−i)
= kivi +
k−i
ki
B−i .
So we have proved the lemmas.
A.2.2 Agents Weakly Prefer wining at Critical Prices
In this section, we will prove that the agents always weakly prefer winning the first item at the critical prices.
First we need to prove a few lemmas.
Lemma A.5. For i = 1, 2, suppose p > 0 satisfies p = Biki+1 =
B−i
k−i for k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 such that k1+k2 = k,
then W (k)i (Bi, B−i, p) ≥ kivi + φ(k−i − 1, ki − 1)vi.
Proof. If agent i wins the first item at price p, then in the subgame of k − 1 items, the remaining budgets
satisfy Bi−pB−i =
ki
k−i . So we are in the tie-breaking case of Proposition 4.1. In this case, agent i will get
ki items for sure, and have probability φ(k−i − 1, ki − 1) of getting an extra item. Further, the remaining
budget is at least zero. So we have W (k)i (Bi, B−i, p) ≥ kivi + φ(k−i − 1, ki − 1)vi.
Lemma A.6. Suppose p > 0 satisfies that p = 1ki+1Bi =
1
k−iB−i for k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 s.t. k1 + k2 = k, then
kivi + φ(k−i − 1, ki) + L(k)i (Bi, B−i, p) ≤ kivi +Bi + φ(k−i − 1, ki)vi.
Proof. If agent i loses the first item at price p, then in the subgame of k − 1 items, the remaining budges
satisfies BiB−i =
ki+1
k−i−1 . So we are in the tie-breaking case of Proposition 4.1. In this case, agent i will get ki
items for sure, and have probability φ(k−i− 2, ki) of getting an extra item. Further, the remaining budget is
at most Bi and at least zero. So we have the desired inequality.
Lemma A.7. Suppose p > 0 satisfies that p = 1ki+1Bi =
1
k−iB−i for k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 s.t. k1 + k2 = k, then
W
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p) > L
(k)
i (Bi, B−i, p).
Proof. Let us assume i = 1 for the sake of presentation. In this case, we have
W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) = v1 + U
(k−1)
1 (B1 − p,B2)
= k1v1 + φ(k2 − 1, k1 − 1)v1 + φ(k1 − 1, k2 − 1)B1 − φ(k1 − 2, k2)B2 .
and
L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) = U
(k−1)
1 (B1, B2 − p)
= k1v1 + φ(k2 − 2, k1)v1 + φ(k1, k2 − 2)B1 − φ(k1 − 1, k2 − 1)B2 .
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Further, by Lemma A.2 we have φ(k2− 1, k1− 1)−φ(k2− 2, k1) =
(
k−1
k1
) (
1
2
)k−1 and φ(k1, k2− 2)−
φ(k1 − 1, k2 − 1) =
(
k−1
k2−1
) (
1
2
)k−1
=
(
k−1
k1
) (
1
2
)k−1. So we have
W (k)(Bi, B−i, p)− L(k)(Bi, B−i, p) = (φ(k2 − 1, k1 − 1)− φ(k2 − 2, k1))v1
−(φ(k1, k2 − 2)− φ(k1 − 1, k2 − 1))B1
+(φ(k1 − 1, k1 − 1)− φ(k2 − 2, k1))B2
=
(
k − 1
k1
)(
1
2
)k−1
(v1 −B1 +B2) > 0 .
So we have proved Lemma A.7.
Lemma A.8. Either both W (k)i and L
(k)
i are continuous at p
(k)
i , in which case agent i is indifferent between
winning or losing the first item at p(k)i , or W
(k)
i is discussions at p
(k)
i , in which case agent i strictly prefers
winning the first item at price p(k)1 .
Proof. For the sake of presentation, we will assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1. There are four cases:
Case 1 Both W (k)1 and L
(k)
1 are continuous at p
(k)
1 . In this case, we can deduce by the definition of p
(k)
1
that W (k)1 (B1, B2, p
(k)
1 ) = L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p
(k)
1 ), that is, agent 1 is indifferent between winning and losing the
first item at price p(k)1 .
Case 2 L(k)1 is continuous at p
(k)
1 but W
(k)
1 is not. In this case, by Lemma A.4 we conclude that p
(k)
1 =
B1 − k1k2B2 for k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 s.t. k1 + k2 = k. By our choice of p
(k)
1 , we have W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) <
L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) for any p > p
(k)
1 , and W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) > L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) for any p < p
(k)
1 . So we have
L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p
(k)
1 ) = lim
p→p(k)1 +
L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) ≥ lim
p→p(k)1 +
W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) = k1v1 +
k1
k2
B2
and
L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p
(k)
1 ) = lim
p→p(k)1 −
L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) ≤ lim
p→p(k)1 −
W
(k)
i (B1, B2, p) = (k1 + 1)v1 .
By the value range of L(k)1 in each continuous interval in Lemma A.4, we know that B2 − k2k1B1 <
p
(k)
1 < B2 +
k2−1
k1+1
B1 and k1v1 ≤ L(k)1 (B1, B2, p(k)1 ) ≤ k1v1 + B1. Finally, the utility for winning the first
item is
W
(k)
1
(
B1, B2, p
(k)
1
)
= v1 + U
(k−1)
(
k1
k2
B2, B2
)
≥ k1v1 + φ(k2 − 1, k1 − 1)v1
≥ k1v1 + 1
2k
v1 > k1v1 +B1 .
Here, the first inequality holds because agent 1 gets k1 items for sure and gets an extra item with proba-
bility φ(k2 − 1, k1 − 1) in this case. So agent 1 strictly prefers winning the first item.
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Case 3 W (k)1 is continuous at p
(k)
1 but L
(k)
1 is not. We will argue this case is impossible. Suppose for
contradiction that this is the case, then p(k)1 = B2 − k2k1 . Similar to the analysis in the second case, we have
that.
W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p
(k)
1 ) = lim
p→p(k)1 +
W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) ≤ lim
p→p(k)1 +
L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) = k1v1
and
W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p
(k)
1 ) = lim
p→p(k)1 −
W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) ≥ lim
p→p(k)1 −
L
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) = (k1 − 1)v1 +B1 .
However, by Lemma A.4 we have B1 − k1−2k2+2B2 < p
(k)
1 < B1 − k1−1k2+1B2. When p
(k)
1 is in this range, the
value of W (k)1 is upper bounded by W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p
(k)
1 ) < (k1− 1)v1 + k1−1k2+1B2 < (k1− 1)v1 +B1. So we
have a contradiction.
Case 4 Both W (k)1 and L
(k)
1 are discontinuous at p
(k)
1 . Then, by Lemma A.4 it must be the case that p
(k)
1 =
B2 − k2−1k1+1B1 = B1 − k1k2B2 for k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 s.t. k1 + k2 = k. So we have that p
(k)
1 =
1
k1+1
B1 =
1
k2
B2.
By Lemma A.7, agent 1 strictly prefers winning the first item at price p(k)1 in this case.
Summarizing the four cases, we have proved the lemma.
A.2.3 Subgame-Perfection of the Canonical Outcome
In this step, we aim to establish the fact that the canonical outcome is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Let
us first prove several lemmas.
Lemma A.9. L(k)i is continuous at p
(k)
i .
Proof. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1. Suppose for contradiction that L(k)1 is discontinuous at p
(k)
1 . Then,
by Lemma A.8, W (k)1 must be discontinuous at p
(k)
1 as well. By Lemma A.4 it must be the case that p
(k)
1 =
B2 − k2−1k1+1B1 = B1 − k1k2B2 for k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 s.t. k1 + k2 = k. So we have that p
(k)
1 =
1
k1+1
B1 =
1
k2
B2.
So it is easy to verify W (k)2 and L
(k)
2 are discontinuous at p
(k)
1 as well, and p
(k)
i is also the critical price of
agent 2, which contradicts our assumption.
Lemma A.10. Suppose p(k)1 = p
(k)
2 . Then, either all of W
(k)
1 , L
(k)
1 , W
(k)
2 , L
(k)
2 are continuous at p
(k)
1 =
p
(k)
2 , or all of them are discontinuous at p
(k)
1 = p
(k)
2 .
Proof. Suppose at least one of W (k)1 , L
(k)
1 , W
(k)
2 , L
(k)
2 is discontinuous at p
(k)
1 = p
(k)
2 . Note that by
P(k), W (k)i is discontinuous at a price p if and only if L(k)−i is discontinuous at p. So we can assume
without loss of generality that W (k)1 and L
(k)
2 are discontinuous at p
(k)
1 = p
(k)
2 . Now by P(k), L(k)2 is
discontinuous at p(k)1 = p
(k)
2 implies W
(k)
2 is discontinuous at p
(k)
1 = p
(k)
2 as well, which further indicates
L
(k)
1 is discontinuous at p
(k)
1 = p
(k)
2 . So we have proved the lemma.
Lemma A.11. Suppose p(k)i > p
(k)
−i . Then, agent i bidding p
(k)
−i+ and agent −i bidding p(k)−i and then both
agents following the canonical outcome in the subgames of k − 1 items is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Proof. It suffices to show that neither of the agents has profitable deviations. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that
i = 1 for the sake of presentation.
First, we will consider the possible deviation of agent 1. We note that agent 1 could not benefit from
bidding over p(k)2 because that would only increases her price for getting the first item. Further, agent 1
could not benefit from bidding below p(k)2 because p
(k)
2 < p
(k)
1 implies that agent 1 strictly prefers winning
the first item at prices p(k)2 .
Next, let us consider the possible deviation of agent 2. Note that underbidding has no effect for that
agent 1 would still win the first item at p(k)2 . Further, by Lemma A.9, L
(k+1)
2 is continuous at p
(k)
2 . So we
get that overbidding has utility at most
lim
p→p(k)2 +
W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p) ≤ lim
p→p(k)2 +
L
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p) = L
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p
(k)
2 ) .
Therefore, overbidding could not be a profitable deviation for agent 2 either.
Lemma A.12. If p(k)1 = p
(k)
2 , then both agents bidding p
(k)
1 = p
(k)
2 and then following the canonical
outcomes in the subgames of k − 1 items is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. We will let p∗ def= p(k)1 = p
(k)
2 for convenience. By symmetry, it suffices to prove agent 1 has no
profitable deviation. By Lemma A.10 we only need to consider the following two cases.
The first case is when all of W (k)1 , L
(k)
1 , W
(k)
2 , L
(k)
2 are continuous at p
∗. In this case, both agents are
indifferent between winning and losing at price p∗. Therefore, underbidding yield utility L(k)1 (B1, B2, p
∗),
which is the same as the utility of bidding p∗. Overbidding is strictly worse because for any p > p∗, we have
W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) < W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p
∗), which again equals the utility of bidding p∗.
The second case is when all of W (k)1 , L
(k)
1 , W
(k)
2 , L
(k)
2 are discontinuous at p
∗. In this case, we have
p∗ = B1 − k1k2B2 = B2 − k2−1k1+1B1 and thus p∗ = 1k1+1B1 = 1k2B2. By Lemma A.7 agent 1 strictly prefers
winning the first item at price p∗ than losing it. So agent 1 will not underbid. If agent 1 overbids p > p∗,
then her utility is
W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p) = v1 + U
(k)
1 (B1 − p,B2)
< v1 + lim
B→( k1
k2
B2)−
U
(k)
1 (B,B2) (B1 − p <
k1
k2
B2)
= v1 + (k1 − 1)v1 + k1
k2
B2 (Lemma A.4)
< k1v1 +B1 . (
B1
B2
≤ k1 + 1
k2
)
On the other hand, the utility of bidding p∗ is
U
(k)
1 (B1, B2) =
1
2
(
W
(k)
1 (B1, B2, p
∗) + L(k)1 (B1, B2, p
(k)
1 )
)
≥ k1v1 + 1
2
B1 +
1
2
(φ(k2 − 1, k1 − 1) + φ(k2 − 1, k1)) v1 (Lemma A.5, Lemma A.6)
≥ k1v1 + 1
2
B1 +
1
2k
v1
> k1v1 +B1 .
So bidding p∗ is strictly better.
By Lemma A.11 and Lemma A.12, we have shown that the canonical outcome is indeed a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the k-item sequential auction.
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A.2.4 Two-Phase Winner Sequence
In this section, we will present the inductive proof for the two-phase winner sequence structure in the
canonical outcome. Again, we will start with a few technical lemmas.
Proposition A.13. Suppose we are not in the type I tie-breaking case of Proposition 4.1. In other words,
there are k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 such that k1 + k2 = k and k1k2+1 < B1B2 ≤ k1+1k2 . Then, for i = 1, 2, agent i gets ki
items with average price at most B−ik−i+1 in the canonical outcome.
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to prove it for i = 1. Let us consider the following strategy for agent 1:
keep bidding p∗ def= B2k2+1 until agent 2’s remaining budget becomes p
∗, and then keep bidding p∗+. It is easy
to verify this strategy guarantees winning at least k1 items regardless of agent 2’s strategy and paying p∗ per
item. So in the canonical outcome, agent 1 pays at most p∗ per item on average.
Lemma A.14. Suppose the budgets do not fall into the tie-breaking cases of Proposition 4.1, then the
budgets after the first round in the canonical outcome do not fall into the tie-breaking cases either.
Proof. We may assume w.l.o.g. that there exists k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 such that k1 + k2 = k, and B1k1+1 < B2k2+1 <
B1
k1
.
Note that B1k1+1 <
B2
k2+1
implies B1k1+1 <
B2
k2
. So by Proposition 3.6 agent 1 gets k1 items and agent 2
gets k2 items in the canonical outcome. Assume for contradiction that the equilibrium of the subgame after
the first round do fall into the tie-breaking case of Proposition 4.1. Then, by Proposition 4.1 the expected
number of items agent 1 gets will be a non-integral number for that in the type I tie-breaking case, there
exists some k′1, k′2 ∈ Z≥0, k′1 + k′2 = 1, such that agent 1 gets at least k′1, and agent 2 gets at least k′2 − 1,
and both agents have some non-zero probability of winning the last item. But Proposition 3.6 asserts that
the number of items agent 1 gets shall be integral. So we have a contradiction.
Lemma A.15. Suppose k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 satisfy that k1 + k2 = k, k1k2+1 < B1B2 < k1+1k2 , and B1B2 6= k1+1k2+1 .
Then, it must be that one of the agent, say, agent i, wins the first ki items and then the other agent wins the
remaining items.
Proof. By Proposition 3.6, agent 1 gets k1 items and agent 2 gets k2 items in the canonical outcome. Sup-
pose for contradiction that the lemma does not hold. Then, by Lemma A.14, and our assumption that Propo-
sition 4.2 and Proposition 3.7 hold for the canonical outcome of k − 1 item, we can assume w.l.o.g. that
agent 1 wins the first item with price p(k)2 in the equilibrium; and then agent 2 wins the next k2 ≥ 1 items
with a non-increasing price sequence q1 ≥ · · · ≥ qk2 such that the average price is at least B2k2+1 ; and finally
agent 1 wins the remaining k1 − 1 ≥ 1 items with prices equal r = B2 −
∑k2
j=1 qj ≤ qk2 , the remaining
budget of agent 2.
Let us consider the deviation in which agent 2 wins the first item at price p(k)2 . By Lemma A.8, ei-
ther agent 2 is indifferent between winning and losing the first item at price p(k)2 , or W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p) is
discontinuous at p = p(k)2 .
Case 1: Agent 2 is indifferent In this case, agent 2 gets k2 items as well in the deviation. So the subgame
does not fall into the tie-breaking case of Proposition 4.1. Our proof strategy is to first show that the price
of the first item must be very small. In particular, it is smaller than the average price that agent 2 pays in the
canonical outcome. Then, we will derive a contradiction by concluding agent 2 has a profitable deviation by
wining the first item since it is so cheap. We can further divide the situation into three cases depending on
the allocation sequence after the first round.
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Case 1a: Agent 1 gets items first after the first round More precisely, after the first round of this
deviation, agent 1 will win the first k1 items with average price at least B1k1+1 and then agent 2 wins the
remaining k2 − 1 item with prices equal agent 1’s remaining budget.
By Proposition 4.2 of k − 1 items and our assumed allocation sequence after agent 1 gets the first item,
such allocation sequence could hold only if the remaining budgets B1 − p(k)2 and B2 after the first round
satisfy B1−p
(k)
2
B2
> k1k2+1 . So we get our first upper bound on the price of the first item: p
(k)
2 < B1− k1k2+1B2.
Via similar reasoning, by Proposition 4.2 and the assumed allocation sequence after agent 2 wins the first
time, we get that the price of the first item is also upper bounded by p(k)2 < B2− k2k1+1B1. Combining these
two upper bounds we get p(k)2 <
B2
k2+1
.
In this case, we argue agent 2 has a profitable deviation because she could have won the first item by
bidding p′ ∈ (p(k)2 , B2k2+1); and then keeps bidding p
(k)
2 until agent 1 wins an item; and finally follows the
canonical outcome strategy thereafter. We let j∗ denote the first item that agent 1 wins in this (profitable)
deviation. On the one hand, agent 2 gets j∗ − 1 items after j∗ rounds in the equilibrium and her remaining
budget is B2 −
∑j∗−1
j=1 qj while agent 1’s remaining budget is B1 − p(k)2 . On the other hand, agent 2 gets
j∗ − 1 as well after j∗ rounds of the deviation and agent 1’s remaining budget is also B1 − p(k)2 . However,
agent 2’s remaining budget after j∗ rounds becomes B2− p′− (j∗− 2)p(k)2 . Recall that q1 ≥ · · · ≥ qk2 and
1
k2
∑k2
j=1 qj ≥ B2k2+1 . So we have
∑j∗−1
j=1 qj ≥ (j∗ − 1) B2k2+1 > p′ + (j∗ − 2)p
(k)
2 . In other words, agent 2’s
remaining budget in the deviation is strictly larger than that in the equilibrium. By the strict monotonicity
of U (k−j
∗)
2 in agent 2’s budget, agent 2 is strictly better off in the deviation. So we have a contradiction.
Case 1b: Agent 2 gets items first after the first round In this case, agent 2 wins the first k2 − 1 items
with average price at least B2−p
(k)
2
k2
after the first round of the deviation, and then agent 1 wins the remaining
items with prices equal agent 2’s remaining budget. Since agent 2 is indifferent between winning and losing
the first item, her remaining budget in the two cases shall be the same. So agent 1 wins the remaining item
with prices equal r in the deviation. Further, agent 1 pays a total price p(k)2 + (k1 − 1)r in the equilibrium
and she weakly prefer winning the first item than losing it. So we have
p
(k)
2 ≤ r ≤ qk2 ≤ · · · ≤ q1 .
If at least one of the inequalities is strict, then similar to case 1a, agent 2 has a profitable deviation by
winning the first item at price p′ ∈ (p(k)2 , q1), and then bidding p(k)2 until agent 1 wins an item, and finally
following the equilibrium strategy.
If all the above inequalities hold with equality, then we conclude that the prices in the sequential auction
are all the same. Let p∗ denote this fixed price in the auction. Note thatB2 =
∑k2
i=1 qi+r = (k2+1)p
∗. We
have p∗ def= B2k2+1 . Note that by Proposition A.13 agent 2 could guarantee getting k2 items paying
B1
k1+1
per
item. So it must be the case that B1k1+1 ≥ B2k2+1 = p∗. Therefore, we have
B1−p∗
k1
≥ p∗. By Proposition 4.2
and Proposition A.13, if agent 1 loses the first item at price p∗, then in the subgame it will be the case that
agent 2 gets the next k2− 1 items with average price at least B2k2+1 = p∗ and then agent 1 gets the remaining
k1 item paying agent 2’s remaining budget which is at most B2k2+1 = p
∗. But agent 1 shall weakly prefer
winning than losing the first item at p∗. So we conclude in the deviation where agent 1 loses the first item
at p∗, all the prices are exactly p∗. Thus, agent 1 has the same utility for winning and losing the first item at
p∗ and p(k)1 = p
∗. Hence, we are in the Type II-B Tie-breaking case of Proposition 4.2. We could assume
agent 2 gets the first k2 items and then agent 1 gets the remaining k1 items without changing the utilities in
the equilibrium.
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Case 2: W (k)2 (B2, B1, p) is discontinuous at p = p
(k)
2 In this case, let us consider a deviation where agent
2 wins the first item with price p(k)2 +  and follows the canonical outcome thereafter. By Proposition 3.4 of
the k − 1 item case, the utility of agent 2 in this deviation approaches k2v2 + k2k1B1 as  goes to zero, while
the utility in the equilibrium is k2v2+r < k2v2+ 1k2+1B2. Yet by our assumption
k2
k1
B1 ≥ 1k1B1 > 1k2+1B2.
So the deviation we considered is profitable.
Summing up all these cases, we either derive contradiction or conclude we are in fact in the Type II-A
Tie-breaking case. Thus, we have proved the lemma.
Now we are ready to present to proof of Proposition 4.2.
of Proposition 4.2. Suppose k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 satisfy that k1 + k2 = k and kik−i+1 <
Bi
B−i <
ki+1
k−i+1 . For the
sake of presentation, let us assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1. By Lemma A.15, it must be the case that some agent
j wins the first kj items and then the other agent wins the rest of the items. It remains to prove that j = 1.
Suppose for contradiction that j = 2. By Proposition A.13, agent 2 could guarantee getting the items with
prices equal B1k1+1 . So the remaining budget of agent 2 is at least B2 − k2 B1k1+1 > B2 − k2k2+1B2 = B2k2+1 .
But now agent i must be paying an average price at least B2k2+1 , contradicting Lemma A.15.
Now it remains to analyze the case of B1B2 =
k1+1
k2+1
. Since inductively we have assume the Type II-B
Tie-breaking of Proposition 4.2 holds in the k− 1 item case, it suffices to show that the critical prices in the
first round are p(k)1 = p
(k)
2 = p
∗ def= B1k1+1 =
B2
k2+1
. Further, by symmetry it suffices to show p(k)1 = p
∗.
For any price of the first item p that is less than p∗, if agent 1 wins the first item at p, then in the induced
subgame agent 1 has budget strictly greater than B1 − p∗ = k1k2+1B2. So by Proposition A.13, agent 1’s
budget at the end shall be strictly greater than B1 − p∗ − (k1 − 1) B2k2+1 > B1k1+1 . If agent 1 loses the
item at p∗, on the other hand, then in the induced subgame agent 2’s budget will be strictly greater than
B2 − p∗ = k2k1+1B1 according to Proposition A.13. So in this case agent 1, at best, could win k1 items with
average price at least than B1k1+1 and have remaining budget at most
B1
k1+1
in the end. Therefore, we conclude
that for any price that is strictly less than p∗, agent 1 will strictly prefer winning the first item than losing
it. Similarly, we could show that for any price that is strictly greater than p∗, agent 1 would strictly prefers
losing the first item. In sum, we have p(k)1 = p
(k)
2 = p
∗.
A.2.5 Weakly Declining Prices
In this section, we will prove the prices in the sequential auction is non-increasing in the number of rounds.
If we are in the tie-breaking cases of Proposition 4.1 or Proposition 4.2, then clearly the price sequence is
non-increasing. So it remains to discuss the case without ties.
Let us assume w.l.o.g. that B1k1+1 <
B2
k2+1
< B1k1 for k1, k2 ∈ Z≥0 s.t. k1 + k2 = k. Then, by Proposi-
tion 4.2 and Proposition A.13 agent 1 will buy the first k1 items with average price at least B1k1+1 and then
agent 2 will win the rest of the items with price equals agent one’s remaining budget, which is at most B1k1+1 .
If the prices are all the same, then it is clearly non-increasing. So let us further assume the prices are not all
the same. So the average price agent 1 pays is strictly greater than B1k1+1 .
If k1 = 1 then the price sequence is clearly non-increasing. Next, we will assume k1 ≥ 2 and agent 1
wins the first k1 items with prices q1, . . . , qk1 . Further, we will assume for contradiction that q1 < q2. By
P(k)3 , we have q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qk1 .
Note that q1 equals the critical price of agent 2. So by Lemma A.8, either W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p) is discontin-
uous at p = q1, or agent 2 is indifferent between winning the first item and losing it at price q1.
In the first case, we have q1 = B2 − k2k1B1. Note that if agent 2 deviates by winning the first item with
price q1+, then her utility approaches k2v2+B2−q1 as  goes to zero. So in the equilibrium, the total price
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Table 5: Summary of the allocation sequences in the equilibrium path and in the deviations considered in
the proof.
Round 1 Round 2 · · · Round j∗ · · ·
Equilibrium 1 wins at q1 1 wins at q2 · · · 1 wins at qj∗ · · ·
Deviation 1 2 wins at q1 1 wins at q′2 · · · 1 wins at q′j∗ · · ·
Deviation 2 1 wins at q1 2 wins at q2 · · · 1 wins at q′′j∗ · · ·
Profitable Deviation 1 wins at q1 1 wins at q2 · · · 2 wins at q1 · · ·
that agent 2 pays is at most q1. Now let us consider the second round, in which agent 1 has remaining budget
k1+k2
k1
B1−B2. Since q2 > q1 and that agent 2 pays at most q1 in total in the equilibrium, we know that agent
2 could not be indifferent between winning and losing the second item at price q2. By Lemma A.8, we get
that q2 is a discontinuous point of W
(k−1)
2 (
k1+k2
k1
B1 − B2, B2). Thus, q2 = B2 − k2k1−1
(
k1+k2
k1
B1 −B2
)
.
By our assumption that q2 > q1, we have B2 − k2k1B1 < B2 − k2k1−1
(
k1+k2
k1
B1 −B2
)
, simplifying which
we get B2k2+1 >
B1
k1
. So we have a contradiction to Proposition 3.6.
Let us move on to the next case that agent 2 is indifferent between winning the first item and losing it
at price q1. We let U1 and U2 denote the utilities in the equilibrium of agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. We
will consider three possible deviation from the equilibrium path that are summarized in Table 5.
The first deviation is when agent 2 wins the first item at price q1 and both agents follows the unique
equilibrium of the subgame thereafter. In this deviation, the allocation sequence after the first round must
by agent 1 wins the next k1 items with a non-increasing price sequence and then agent 2 wins the remaining
k2 − 1 items paying agent 1’s remaining budget. Otherwise, by Proposition 4.2 and Proposition A.13,
agent 1 pays an average price that is at most B1k1+1 . So agent 1 is strictly better off by losing the first item,
contradicting our assumption. We will let q′2 ≥ · · · ≥ q′k1+1 denote the prices at which agent 1 wins the
items. Let U ′1 and U ′2 denote the utilities in this deviation of agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. By our
assumption, U2 = U ′2 and U1 ≥ U ′1.
The second deviation is when agent 1 wins the first item at price q1 as in the equilibrium, but agent
2 wins the second item at price q2, and then both agents follows the unique equilibrium of the subgame
thereafter. Similar to the previous reasonings, in this subgame it must be the case that agent 1 wins the next
k1−1 items at some non-increasing price sequence and then agent 2 wins the remaining k2−1 items paying
agent 1’s remaining budget. We will let q′′3 ≥ · · · ≥ q′′k1+2 denote the prices at which agent 1 wins the next
k1 − 1 items starting from round 3, and let U ′′1 and U ′′2 denote the utilities in this deviation of agent 1 and
agent 2 respectively. By Lemma A.8, both agents shall weakly prefer winning the second item at price q2
after losing the first one at q1. So we have U ′′2 ≥ U2 and U ′′1 ≤ U1.
By comparing the utilities of agent 2 in the unique equilibrium and in these two deviations, we have
U ′′2 ≥ U2 = U ′2. Note that U ′′2 = v2+U (k−2)2 (B1− q1, B2− q2) and U ′2 = v2+U (k−2)2 (B1− q′2, B2− q1).
So we have U (k−2)2 (B1 − q1, B2 − q2) ≥ U (k−2)2 (B1 − q′2, B2 − q1). Further, we have B2 − q2 < B2 − q1
due to our assumption that q1 < q2. So by the monotonicity of U
(k−2)
2 , we must have B1 − q1 < B1 − q′2,
and thus q1 > q′2.
Further, by U1 ≥ U ′1, and by U1 = k1v1 + B1 −
∑k1
i=1 qi and U
′
1 = k1v1 + B1 =
∑k1+1
i=2 q
′
i, we have∑k1
i=1 qi ≤
∑k1+1
i=2 q
′
i. Since q1 > q
′
2 ≥ · · · ≥ q′k1+1, we conclude that
∑k1
i=1 qi < k1q1. Thus, there exist
3 ≤ j ≤ k1 such that qj < q1. Let j∗ denote the smallest such j.
Now we conclude that agent 2 has a profitable deviation because she could let agent 1 wins the first
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j∗ − 1 items at price q1, . . . qj∗−1, and then wins the next item by bidding q1 −  > qj∗ . The utility of agent
2 in this deviation will be U (k−j
∗)
2 (B1 −
∑j∗−1
i=1 qi, B2 − q1 + ) > U (k−j
∗)
2 (B1 −
∑j∗
i=2 q
′
i, B2 − q1) = U ′2
due to the fact that
∑j∗−1
i=1 qi > (j
∗ − 1)q1 >
∑j∗
i=2 q
′
i. Further, U
′
2 = U2 by our assumption. So this is a
profitable deviation for agent 2 and we have a contradiction.
A.2.6 Monotonicity and Continuity of Utility
Finally, let us analyze the monotonicity and continuity of U (k)i with respect to the budgets and prove Propo-
sition 3.3 and Proposition 3.8.
Let us first consider the case when B
∗
1
B∗2
6= k1+1k2+1 . We will assume w.l.o.g. that k1k2+1 <
B∗1
B∗2
< k1+1k2+1 . Then,
there exists a neighborhood of (B∗1 , B∗2) such that for any budget profile (B1, B2) in the neighborhood we
have k1k2+1 <
B1
B2
< k1+1k2+1 . In other words, it is the case that agent 1 gets the first k1 items and then agent 2
gets the remaining items in the equilibrium.
We will consider the monotonicity and continuity U (k)1 and U
(k)
2 as B1 increases. By Proposition 4.2,
agent 1 will get items first in the canonical outcome and thus agent 1 will get the first item paying agent
2’s critical price p(k)2 . Further, consider any sufficiently small  > 0 such that
k1
k2+1
<
B∗1+
B∗2
< k1+1k2+1 . We
let p′2() denote the critical price of agent 2 when the budgets are B∗1 +  and B∗2 . We need the following
lemmas in our argument.
Lemma A.16. L(k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1 , p) is continuous at p = p
(k)
2 .
Proof. Suppose not. Then, p(k)2 is a discontinuous point of L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p). By Lemma A.8, we know
W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p) must be discontinuous at p
(k)
2 as well. Thus, it must be the case that p
(k)
2 = B
∗
1 − k1−1k2+1B∗2
and p(k)2 = B
∗
2 − k2k1B∗1 , which implies p
(k)
2 =
1
k2+1
B∗2 =
1
k1
B∗1 . So we have
B∗1
B∗2
= k1k2+1 , contradicting the
assumption in the lemma.
Given the continuity of L(k)2 at p = p
(k)
2 , we can upper bound how much the price of the first item
increases as B1 increases as follows.
Lemma A.17. p′2() < p
(k)
2 +  for sufficiently small  > 0.
Proof. By the monotonicity of W (k)2 , for nay p < p
(k)
2 +  we have W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + , p
(k)
2 + ) <
W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p). So
W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + , p
(k)
2 + ) < lim
p→p(k)2 +
W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p)
≤ lim
p→p(k)2 +
L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p) (By P(k))
= L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) (By Lemma A.16)
= L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 + ) .
So agent 2 would prefer losing than winning the first item at price p(k)2 +  when the budgets are B
∗
1 + 
and B∗2 . So p′2() < p
(k)
2 + .
Given Lemma A.17, the monotonicity of the agents’ utilities in B1 follows straightforwardly.
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Lemma A.18. U (k)1 (B∗1 + , B∗2) > U
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 , B
∗
2) and U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + ) ≤ U (k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1) for sufficiently
small  > 0.
Proof. By Lemma A.17, we have
U
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 + , B
∗
2) =W
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 + , B
∗
2 , p
′
2()) > W
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 + , B
∗
2 , p
(k)
2 + )
=W
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 , B
∗
2 , p
(k)
2 ) = U
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 , B
∗
2)
and
U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + ) = L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + , p
′
2()) ≤ L(k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1 + , p(k)2 + )
= L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) = U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1) .
Therefore, we have deduced the desired monotonicity of the utilities.
In order to prove continuity, we will first show the continuity of agent 2’s critical price as B1 increases.
Since Lemma A.17 already provides us with a lower bound of p′(), we only need to come up with a lower
bound of p′().
Lemma A.19. For any sufficiently small  > 0, we have p′2() > p
(k)
2 − k2k1 .
Proof. First, let us consider the case when W (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p) is continuous at p = p
(k)
2 . In this case, by
Lemma A.8 we know that W (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) = L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ). We let p
′′
2() = p
(k)
2 −  (B
∗
2−p(k)2 )
B∗1
.
Then, p′′2() < p
(k)
2 and it is easy to verify that B
∗
2 − p′′2() = B
∗
1+
B∗1
(B∗2 − p(k)2 ).
On the one hand, we have
W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + , p
′′
2()) = v2 + U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2 − p′′2(), B∗1 + )
= v2 + U
(k−1)
2
(
B∗1 + 
B∗1
(B∗2 − p(k)2 ),
B∗1 + 
B∗1
B∗1
)
≥ v2 + U (k−1)2 (B∗2 − p(k)2 , B∗1) =W (k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1 , p(k)2 ) . (1)
Here the last inequality holds because when both agents’ budgets are multiply by the same factor, we
will have the same allocation sequences and the remaining budget is multiply by the same factor.
On the other hand, by p′′2() < p
(k)
2 we have B
∗
1 − p(k)2 < B∗1 + − p′′2(). So we have
L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) = U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 − p(k)2 ) < U (k−1)2 (B∗2 , B∗1 + − p′′2())
= L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + , p
′′
2()) . (2)
By (1), (2), and L(k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) = W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ), we get that L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + , p
′′
2()) <
W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
′′
2()). Thus, p
′
2() ≥ p′′2().
Note that W (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) = L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) ∈ [k2v2, (k2 + 1)v2) because agent 2 gets k2 items
in the equilibrium. So by W (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) = v2 + U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2 − p(k)2 , B∗1), we get that U (k−1)2 (B∗2 −
p
(k)
2 , B
∗
1) ∈ [(k2 − 1)v2, k2v2). Therefore, agent 1 gets k1 items and agent 2 gets k2 − 1 items in the
induced subgame after agent 2 wins the first item. So by P(k) we have that B∗2−p
(k)
2
B∗1
< k2k1 and therefore
p′2() ≥ p′′2() = p(k)2 − (B
∗
2−p(k)2 )
B∗1
> p
(k)
2 − k2k1 .
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Next, we will consider the case when W (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p) is discontinuous at p = p
(k)
2 . In this case, we
know that B
∗
2−p(k)2
B∗1
= k2k1 and thus p
(k)
2 = B
∗
2−k2k1B∗1 . Since for any p < B∗2−k2k1 (B∗1+)we have
B∗2−p
B∗1
> k2k1 ,
we get thatW (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1+, p) ≥ (k2+1)v2 > L(k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1+, p) for any p < B∗2− k2k1 (B∗1+). Therefore,
we have p′2() ≥ B∗2 − k2k1 (B∗1 + ) = p
(k)
2 − k2k1 .
Now we are ready to show the continuity of U (k)1 and U
(k)
2 in B1.
Lemma A.20. We have
lim
→0+
U
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 + , B
∗
2) = U
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 , B
∗
2) , lim
→0+
U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + ) = U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1) .
Proof. Note that
lim
→0+
U
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 + , B
∗
2) = lim
→0+
(
v1 + U
(k−1)
1 (B
∗
1 + − p′2(), B∗2)
)
(3)
lim
→0+
U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + ) = lim
→0+
U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + − p′2()) (4)
Note that we have inductively assume thatU (k−1)1 andU
(k−1)
2 are continuous atB1 = B
∗
1−p(k)2 . Further,
by Lemma A.17 and Lemma A.19, we know that lim→0+(B∗1 +  − p′2()) = B∗1 − p(k)2 . So from (3) we
have lim→0+ U
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 + , B
∗
2) = v1 + U
(k−1)
1 (B
∗
1 − p′2(), B∗2) = U (k)1 (B∗1 , B∗2) and from (4) we have
lim→0+ U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 + ) = U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 − p′2()) = U (k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1).
Similarly, we could show the desired monotonicity and continuity of U (k)1 and U
(k)
2 asB1 decreases. We
will omit the tedious calculation in this paper.
Next, let us move on to how U (k)1 and U
(k)
2 behaves as B2 changes. Again, we will only consider the
case that B2 increases as the opposite case is very similar.
Lemma A.21. Suppose a budget profile (B1, B2) satisfies
k′1
k′2+1
< B1B2 <
k′1+1
k′2+1
for k′1 + k′2 = k − 1. Then,
for sufficiently small  > 0, we have U (k−1)2 (B2 + , B1) ≥ U (k−1)2 (B2, B1) + .
Proof. Since k
′
1
k′2+1
< B1B2 <
k′1+1
k′2+1
, in the canonical outcome of a sequential auction with k − 1 item and
budget profile (B1, B2), agent 1 will get the first k′1 items and agent 2 gets the remaining k′2 items. Further,
for sufficiently small , we have the same allocation sequence in the canonical outcome when the budget
profile is (B1, B2 + ).
By Proposition 3.3 of the k−1 item cases, we have U (k−1)1 (B1, B2) ≥ U (k−1)1 (B1, B2+ ). So the total
price that agent 1 pays becomes higher or remains the same as agent 2’s budget changes from B2 to B2 + .
Note that in the equilibrium allocation sequences of both cases, agent 2 pays agent 1’s remaining budget for
each item. So the total price that agent 2 pays decreases and remains the same as her budget increases from
B2 to B2 + . Thus, we have U
(k−1)
2 (B2 + , B1) ≥ U (k−1)2 (B2, B1) + .
Lemma A.22. k1k2 ≤
B∗1
B∗2−p(k)2
< k1+1k2 .
Proof. By W (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) ≥ L(k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1 , p(k)2 ) = U (k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1) and that agent 2 gets k2 items in
equilibrium, we get that agent 2 gets at least k2−1 items in the induced subgame after winning the first item
at price p(k)2 . So we have
k1
k2
≤ B∗1
B∗2−p(k)2
< k1+1k2−1 .
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Next, we will show that B
∗
1
B∗2−p(k)2
< k1+1k2 . Suppose not. Then, by P
(k)
2 and P(k) we have that agent 2’s
remaining budget at the end of the induced subgame after she wins the first round is at most B
∗
1
k1+1
. On the
other hand, by P(k)2 we know that in the equilibrium of the k-item sequential auction, agent 2’s remaining
budget is at least B∗2 − k2 B
∗
1
k1+1
> k2+1k1+1B
∗
1 − k2 B
∗
1
k1+1
=
B∗1
k1+1
. So we deduce that W (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) <
L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ), contradicting Lemma A.8.
Further, since that agent 1 gets the first k1 item in the equilibrium, we know that agent 1 gets the first
k1 − 1 in the induced subgame after she wins the first item at price p(k)2 . So by Proposition 4.2 of the k − 1
item cases, we have the following.
Lemma A.23. k1−1k2+1 <
B∗1−p(k)2
B∗2
< k1k2+1 .
Lemma A.24. U (k)2 (B∗2 + , B∗1) ≥ U (k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1) +  for sufficiently small  > 0.
Proof. If k1k2 =
B∗1
B∗2−p(k)2
, then W (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p) is discontinuous at p = p
(k)
2 . In this case, agent 2 could
have bid p(k)2 +  when her budget is B
∗
2 + . If she wins the first round, then by B
∗
2 +  − (p(k)2 +
) = B∗2 − p(k)2 = k2k1B∗1 , she has some chance of winning k2 + 1 items. So the utility would greater
than U (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1) + , where agent 2 only gets k2 items. If she loses the first round, then her utility is
U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2+ , B
∗
1−p(k)2 − ). By Lemma A.21 and the monotonicity of U (k−1)2 inB1, this utility is greater
or equal to U (k−1)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 −p(k)2 )+  = U (k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1)+ . If k1k2 6=
B∗1
B∗2−p(k)2
, then by Lemma A.22 we have
k1
k2
<
B∗1
B∗2−p(k)2
< k1+1k2 . Moreover, for sufficiently small  > 0, we have
k1
k2
<
B∗1
B∗2+−p(k)2
< k1+1k2 . Thus, by
letting k′1 = k1 and k′2 = k2 − 1 in Lemma A.21, we get that
W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) = v2 + U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2 + − p(k)2 , B∗1) (Definition of W (k)2 )
≥ v2 + U (k−1)2 (B∗2 − p(k)2 , B∗1) +  (Lemma A.21)
=W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) +  (Definition of W
(k)
2 )
≥ L(k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1 , p(k)2 ) +  (P(k))
= U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1) +  . (5)
Further, by Lemma A.23 we have k1−1k2+1 <
B∗1−p(k)2
B∗2
< k1k2+1 . So for sufficiently small  > 0, we have
k1−1
k2+1
<
B∗1−p(k)2
B∗2+
< k1k2+1 . Therefore, by letting k
′
1 = k1 − 1 and k′2 = k2 in Lemma A.21, we have that
L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) = U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1 − p(k)2 ) ≥ U (k−1)2 (B∗2 , B∗1 − p(k)2 ) + 
= L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 ) +  = U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1) +  . (6)
By (5) and (6), agent 2 could have bid p(k)2 and guaranteed at least U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1) +  utility when her
budget is B∗2 +  for sufficiently small . Thus, U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1) ≥ U (k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1) + .
Lemma A.25. U (k)1 (B∗1 , B∗2 + ) ≤ U (k)1 (B∗1 , B∗2) for sufficiently small  > 0.
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Proof. Let us consider the equilibrium allocation sequences when the budget profiles are (B∗1 , B∗2) and
(B∗1 , B∗2 + ) for sufficiently small  > 0. By our assumption, in both cases agent 1 will gets the first k1
items and then agent 2 will get the remaining k2 items paying agent 1’s remaining budget for each item.
By Lemma A.24, we have U (k)2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1) ≥ U (k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1)+ . Thus, the total price that agent 2 pays
when her budget is B∗2 +  is lower than that when her budget is B∗2 . So we conclude that the remaining
budget of agent 1 when agent 2’s budget is B∗2 +  is smaller than that when agent 2’s budget is B∗2 . In other
words, U (k)1 (B
∗
1 , B
∗
2 + ) ≤ U (k)1 (B∗1 , B∗2).
By Lemma A.24 and Lemma A.25, we have shown the desired monotonicity of U (k)1 and U
(k)
2 in B2. It
remains to show the utility functions are continuous in B2 at point (B∗1 , B∗2). We will let p′2() denote the
critical price of agent 2 when the budgets are B∗1 and B∗2 + . In other words, p′2() is the price that agent 1
pays in the first round.
Lemma A.26. For sufficiently small  > 0, we have p′2() ≤ p(k)2 + .
Proof. Consider a price p(k)2 + + 
′ for sufficiently small ′ > 0. By the definition of W (k)2 , we have
W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 + + 
′) = v2 + U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2 − p(k)2 − ′, B∗1)
= W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 + 
′) . (7)
Further, by the monotonicity of U (k−1)2 , we have
L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 + + 
′) = U (k−1)2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1 − p(k)2 − − ′)
> U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 − p(k)2 − ′)
= L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 + 
′) . (8)
Finally, by definition of p(k)2 , for any p > p
(k)
2 , we have W
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p) < L
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1 , p). So by (7),
(8), we have W (k)2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 + + 
′) < L(k)2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1 , p
(k)
2 + + 
′). Note that this hold for any
′ > 0. So by the definition of critical prices, p′2() ≤ p(k)2 + .
Lemma A.27. We have
lim
→0+
U
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 , B
∗
2 + ) = U
(k)
1 (B
∗
1 , B
∗
2) and lim
→0+
U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1) = U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1) .
Proof. On the one hand, by Lemma A.24 we have U (k)2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1) ≥ U (k)2 (B∗2 , B∗1) + , which goes
to U (k)2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1) as  goes to zero. On the other hand, by Lemma A.26, we have U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1) =
U
(k−1)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1−p′2()) ≤ U (k−1)2 (B∗2 + , B∗1−p(k)2 − ), which also goes to U (k−1)2 (B∗2 , B∗1−p(k)2 ) =
U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1) as  goes to zero due to the continuity of U
(k)
2 . So we have lim→0+ U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 + , B
∗
1) =
U
(k)
2 (B
∗
2 , B
∗
1).
Note that agent 2 will get the last k2 items paying agent 1’s remaining budget for each item. So the
continuity of agent 2’s utility implies that the remaining budget of agent 1 and and the utility of agent 1 are
continuous in B2 at point (B∗1 , B∗2).
Finally, it remains to prove the continuity and monotonicity at B
∗
1
B∗2
= k1+1k2+1 . In fact, we can use the same
arguments as above, except that we will assume the allocation sequence is agent 1 gets item first when we
consider B1 approaches B∗1 from below or B2 approaches B∗2 from above, and assume agent 2 getting items
first for the other two cases.
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Proof. Since we have proved Lemma A.18, Lemma A.20, Lemma A.24, Lemma A.25, Lemma A.27, it
remains to verify the boundary conditions. We will analyze how U (k)1 (B1, B2) behaves as B2 approaches
k2
k1
B1 from below. The proof of the other cases are very similar and we will omit them in this extended
abstract.
Suppose B2 = k2+1k1 B1 −  for sufficiently small  > 0. Then, by Proposition 4.2, agent 1 will get the
first k1 items in the canonical outcome and then agent 2 will get the remaining k2 items paying agent 1’s
remaining budget. In particular, agent 1 will win the first item paying agent 2’s critical price p(k)2 .
Next, we will let p∗ = B1k1 for the sake of expedition and argue p
(k)
2 ≥ p∗ − . If agent 2 wins the first
item at p∗− , then her remaining budget becomes k2k1B1. So by Proposition 4.1, agent 2 will have non-zero
probability of winning k2+1 items. Hence, agent 2 shall strictly prefers winning the first item at p∗− . So
we have p(k)2 ≥ p∗ − .
Therefore, we have U (k)1 (B1, B2) = U
(k−1)(B1 − p(k)2 , B2) ≤ U (k−1)1 (B1 − p∗ + , B2). If we let 
goes to zero, the limit of the right-hand-size goes to k1v1 by our inductive hypothesis. So
lim
B2→ k2+1k1 B
−
1
U
(k)
1 (B1, B2) ≤ k1v1 .
Further, U (k)1 (B1, B2) ≥ k1v1 for any  > 0. So the above holds with equality.
Finally, let us consider the utility of agent i when BiB−i =
ki
k−i+1 . We will assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1
for the sake of presentation. By Proposition 4.1, both agents will keep bidding p∗ def= B1k1 =
B2
k2+1
until
one of the agent runs out of her budget. So agent 1 will get k1 − 1 items for sure, and with probability
φ(k2, k1−1), agent 1will get an extra item. For n = 1, . . . , k1−1, with probability φ(n, k2)−φ(n−1, k2) =(
k2+n
n
) (
1
2
)k2+n+1, agent 1 gets exactly n items before agent 2 gets k2+1 items. So the utility for agent i is
U
(k)
1 (B1, B2) = (k1 − 1)v1 + φ(k2, k1 − 1)v1 +
k1−1∑
n=1
(
k2 + n
n
)(
1
2
)k2+n+1
(B1 − np∗) .
Further,
k1−1∑
n=1
(
k2 + n
n
)(
1
2
)k2+n+1
(B1 − np∗)
= φ(k1 − 1, k2)B1 − (k2 + 1)p∗
k1−1∑
n=1
(
k2 + n
n− 1
)(
1
2
)k2+n+1
= φ(k1 − 1, k2)B1 − (k2 + 1)p∗φ(k1 − 2, k2 + 1) .
Since, p∗ = B2k2+1 by our assumption, we have proved the asserted utility.
B Semi-Trembling-Hand-Perfection of the Canonical Outcome
In this section, we will prove that the canonical outcome is the only stable equilibrium under the refinement
of semi-trembling-hand-perfection.
Lemma B.1. For i = 1, 2, suppose p(k)i > p
(k)
−i . Then, the canonical outcome is the unique semi-trembling-
hand-perfect and subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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In the following discussion, let us assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1 in Lemma B.1 for the sake of presentation.
In order to prove Lemma B.1, we will first show a few lemmas. The first lemma clarifies the potential
equilibrium strategies we need to consider.
Lemma B.2. Suppose p(k)1 > p
(k)
2 and the agents follow the canonical outcome in the subgames of k − 1
items. Then, the only candidate equilibrium strategy for the first round is agent 1 bidding p+ and agent 2
bidding p for p(k)1 ≥ p ≥ p(k)2 .
Proof. First, we note that one of the agents bidding strictly greater than the other (p+ is not considered
greater than p) cannot be an equilibrium because by the monotonicity of W (k)1 and W
(k)
2 , the winner will
make a lower bid in order to get the first item with a lower price. Further, both agents bidding strictly greater
than p(k)1 cannot be an equilibrium because the winner (in case of tie, both agents) will prefer losing the first
item at such a high price. Moreover, both agents bidding strictly smaller then p(k)2 cannot be an equilibrium
either, because the loser (in case of tie, both agents) will prefer bid slightly higher and wins the first item.
Finally, both agents bidding p for p(k)1 ≥ p ≥ p(k)2 , that is, agent 1 did not use the privilege of bidding p+,
cannot be an equilibrium, because either agent 1 would strictly prefer bidding p+ (if p < p(k)1 ) or agent 2
would strictly prefer underbids and losing the item (if p > p(k)2 ). In sum, the only candidate equilibrium
strategy for the first round is agent 1 bidding p+ and agent 2 bidding p for p(k)1 ≥ p ≥ p(k)2 .
Lemma B.3. Then, bidding p > p(k)2 in the first round (and follows the unique equilibrium in the induced
subgame) is weakly dominated for agent 2.
Proof. Let us consider the alternative strategy of bidding p(k)2 +  < p for sufficiently small  > 0. We will
show this strategy weakly dominates bidding p for agent 2.
If agent 1 bids pˆ > p, then both strategies lose the first item at pˆ and therefore yield the same payoff.
If agent 1 bids pˆ = p or p+, then by p > p(k)2 we have L
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p) > W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p). So the
utility of bidding p is at most L(k)2 (B2, B1, p), which equals the utility of bidding p
(k)
2 +  and losing the
first item.
If agent 1 bids pˆ s.t. p(k)2 +  ≤ pˆ < p, then the utility of bidding p is W (k)2 (B2, B1, p). By the
monotonicity of W (k)2 , this is less than W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, pˆ). Further, by pˆ > p
(k)
2 +  ≥ p(k)2 , we get that
W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, pˆ) ≤ L(k)2 (B2, B1, pˆ). So bidding p(k)2 +  and losing the first item at pˆ is strictly better.
Finally , if agent 1 bids pˆ < p(k)2 + , then the both strategies wins the first item. So bidding p
(k)
2 is
strictly better for that W (k)2 is decreasing as the price increases.
Lemma B.4. Suppose p(k)1 > p
(k)
2 and the agents follow the canonical outcome in the subgames of k − 1
items. Then, for any p s.t. p(k)1 ≥ p > p(k)2 , agent 1 bidding p+ and agent 2 bidding p is not a semi-
trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Consider any sequence {σj}j of completely mixed strategies of agent 1 that converges to bidding
p+. We will argue bidding strictly greater than p(k)2 is sub-optimal for agent 2 when agent 1 use strategy
σj for any j because it is weakly dominated. Therefore, the best responses of {σj}j cannot converges to
bidding p since p > p(k)2 . So it is not a semi-trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium.
Lemma B.5. Suppose p(k)1 > p
(k)
2 and the agents follow the canonical outcome in the subgames of k − 1
items. Then, agent 1 bidding p(k)2 + and agent 2 bidding p
(k)
2 is a semi-trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium.
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Proof. Let us first consider the stability of agent 2’s strategy. Consider the following sequence {σj}j of
completely mixed strategies of agent 1 that converges to bidding p(k)2 +. Let
αj =W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p
(k)
2 (1− 2−j))−W (k)2 (B2, B1, 0)
denote the gain of winning the first item for free instead of p(k)2 (1− 2−j−1) for agent 2. Let
βj =W
(k)
2 (B2, B1, p
(k)
2 (1− 2−j−1))− L(k)2 (B2, B1, p(k)2 (1− 2−j−1))
denote the gain of winning the first item rather than losing it for agent 2 when the price is p(k)2 (1− 2−j−1).
We will let γj = min{1, βjαj } and define σj such that the probability density of agent 1 bidding p when she
uses σj is:
fσj (p) =

1
2jp2
, if
∣∣∣p− p(k)2 ∣∣∣ ≤ p22j
γj
22j+2p2
, if
∣∣∣p− p(k)2 ∣∣∣ > p22j ,
and we will choose the probability of bidding p(p)2 + properly such that the probability sum up to 1. It is easy
to verify this sequence of completely mixed strategies converges to bidding p(p)2 .
Further, by Lemma B.3 we get that the best response must be bids smaller or equal to p(p)2 .
Finally, we claim any bid p that is smaller than p(p)2 (1− 2−j) is strictly worse off comparing to bidding
p
(p)
2 (1 − 2−j−1). When agent 1 bids above p(k)2 (1 − 2−j−1), both strategy yields the same payoff. When
agent 1 bids between p(k)2 (1 − 2−j) and p(k)2 (1 − 2−j−1), which happens with prabability 2−2j−1 by our
choice of σj , bidding p
(k)
2 (1−2−j−1) is better by at least βj . When agent 1 bids below p(k)2 (1−2−j), which
happens with probability at most γj2−2j−2 by our choice of σj , bidding p could be better off by at most αj .
So by γj ≤ βjαj , we get that bidding p
(k)
2 (1 − 2−j−1) is better for agent 2. Therefore, we get that any best
response bid to σj must be at least p
(k)
2 (1− 2−j−1).
Summing up the above upper and lower bounds on the best response bids of agent 2, we get that the best
responses of σj converges to bidding p
(p)
2 as j increases.
The stability of agent 1’s strategy can be proved similarly. So the canonical outcome is semi-trembling-
hand-perfect.
Summarizing Lemma B.2, Lemma B.3, Lemma B.4, and Lemma B.5, we have proved Lemma B.1. Via
simlar analysis, we can show the canonical outcome is “stable” as well when the critical prices are the same
in the first round. We will omit the details here.
Lemma B.6. Suppose p(k)1 = p
(k)
2 . Then, the canonical outcome is the unique semi-trembling-hand-perfect
and subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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